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DISCLAIMERS OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
LIABILITY: TIME FOR A CRACKDOWN?
MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS*
As a leading authority on employee dismissal law observed in 1989,
"[t]he most significant employment law development in the last quarter
of the 20th century has been the erosion of the employment-at-will rule
and the recognition of a family of common law rights protecting individ-
ual employees against wrongful dismissal."' But the newly developed
common law of wrongful discharge hardly reigns supreme or rests se-
cure. A few states refuse to adopt any of the three major common law
exceptions to employment at will: (1) the public policy theory; (2) the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) a set of theories
by which employers are rendered liable for express statements about dis-
charge policy.2 In addition, some recent cases suggest that courts are
scaling back the exceptions in states where they once appeared solidly
entrenched.3 Finally, due in part to escalating wrongful discharge recov-
eries,4 a uniform termination act has recently been promulgated,5 and
* Professor of Business Law, School of Business, Indiana University. J.D., 1973, Columbia
University. LL.M., 1975, George Washington University. S.J.D., 1981, George Washington
University.
1. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer Self
Interest Lie?, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 397, 397 (1989) (footnote omitted). The employment-at-will rule
states that either party to an employment contract for an indefinite time period can terminate the
contract at any time and for any reason.
2. See 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA), Ind. Emp. Rights Manual, at 505:51-52 [hereinafter IERM]
(containing a 1992 chart which suggests that as many as five states still resist the three major com-
mon-law exceptions to employment at will).
3. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 379-80, 389-401 (Cal. 1988) (en
banc) (rejecting a public policy exception claim because the policy in question was insufficiently
"public," and holding that breaching the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not
give rise to a tort claim); Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268, 308 (Mich. 1991)
(Cavanagh, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority in this case had virtually overruled Tous-
saint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W. 2d 880 (Mich. 1980)). For a discussion of the landmark
Toussaint decision, see infra notes 62-64.
4. See. e.g., Jonathan Tompkins, Legislating the Employment Relationship: Montana's Wrong-
ful-Discharge Law, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 387, 392 (1988); Tell It to the Arbitrator, Bus. WK.,
Nov. 4, 1991, at 109.
5. See Uniform Employment-Termination Act (1991), in IERM, supra note 2, at 540:21-41
[hereinafter Uniform Act]; see also Randall Samborn, At- Will Doctrine Under Fire, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
14, 1991, at 1 (describing the bar's reaction to the Model Act).
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one state now regulates the subject by statute.6
Getting relatively short shrift amidst this activity, however, is an as-
sault on the common law of wrongful discharge that has been underway
since at least the early 1980s. Adopting the time-honored response of
business firms confronted with burdensome new judge-made law, today's
employers consistently attempt to contract away potential wrongful dis-
charge liability. Although most litigation on these disclaimers or at-will
clauses has involved the third set of wrongful discharge theories just
noted,7 employers have been fairly successful in blocking liability under
those theories. In this effort to curtail liability for their own express
statements, employers have received assistance from the relatively few
writers who have addressed the subject.'
Unlike most of the scant commentary on at-will clauses, this Article is
not another how-to-do-it piece for eliminating bothersome wrongful dis-
missal recoveries. Instead, the Article argues that state courts and/or
legislatures should impose much stricter tests on disclaimers of wrongful
discharge liability. The Article contends that current law on the subject
tends to impede rational employee choice in an area where such choice
actually can be effective. The Article begins with a brief treatment of
employment at will and its modem exceptions. The Article then de-
scribes the law regarding disclaimers of wrongful discharge liability.
Next, the Article critiques that body of law by examining it within the
context set by the policy debate over employment at will. Finally, the
Article proposes idealized tests for the enforceability of at-will clauses,
and suggests how existing contract doctrine might be used to attack
those clauses.
6. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1992) (establishing, inter alia, a good-cause
standard for covered discharges, but limiting damages for violations and permitting arbitration of
wrongful discharge claims); see also P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185a (1989) (establishing a good-
cause standard, with indemnity for its violation based on the employee's length of service).
7. See generally infra notes 51-66, 96-151 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Michael A. Chagares, Utilization of the Disclaimer as an Effective Means to Define
the Employment Relationship, 17 HOrSTRA L. REV. 365, 380-99 (1989); John D. Coombe, Employee
Handbooks: Asset or Liability?, 12 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 4, 15-16 (1986); James G. Frierson, How to
Fire Without Getting Burned, 67 PERSONNEL, Sept. 1990, at 44; Kenneth R. Gilberg, Employee
Terminations: Risky Business, 32 PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATOR, Mar. 1987, at 40; William H. Hol-
ley, Jr. & Roger S. Wolters, An Employment-at-Will Vulnerability Audit, 66 PERSONNEL J., Apr.
1987, at 130, 136; Maureen Reidy Witt & Sandra R. Goldman, Avoiding Liability in Employee
Handbooks, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 5, 12-17 (1988); Cynthia Weber Scherb, Note, The Use of
Disclaimers to Avoid Employer Liability Under Employee Handbook Provisions, 12 J. CORP. L, 105,
105 (1986).
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I. THE RISE AND DECLINE OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
A. The Rule and its Emergence
The story of employment at will's development has been told often, 9
but it deserves a brief restatement. In medieval England, the courts con-
strued an employment contract for an indefinite period as a hiring for a
year.'0 Within that period, however, the contract usually could be termi-
nated upon reasonable notice" or for just cause. 12 Some nineteenth cen-
tury American courts continued England's one-year rule,'" while others
read different content into indefinite-term employment contracts.14 In
virtually all these situations, however, the parties were bound in some
circumstances or for some period of time.
With the emergence of employment at will toward the end of the nine-
teenth century, this situation changed dramatically. The following state-
ment from Horace G. Wood's 1877 employment law treatise is generally
regarded as the first authoritative statement of the new doctrine:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring,
the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day,
week, month or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no
presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed
for whatever time the party may serve. It is competent for either party to
show what the mutual understanding of the parties was in reference to the
matter; but unless their understanding was mutual that the service was to
extend for a certain fixed and definite period, it is an indefinite hiring and is
determinable at the will of either party.' 5
Commentators have argued that the cases Wood cited for his employ-
9. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HisT. 118 (1976); Daniel A. Mathews, Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Dis-
charged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1438-43 (1975); J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune,
Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN L. REV. 335, 340-47 (1974).
10. E.g., Feinman, supra note 9, at 119-21.
11. Id. at 121.
12. Mathews, supra note 9, at 1439.
13. E.g., id., at 1439 n.20.
14. E.g., Kelly McWilliams, Note, The Employment Handbook as a Contractual Limitation on
the Employment at Will Doctrine, 31 VILL. L. REV. 335, 338 n.10 (1986) (some courts presumed
that employment would continue for time equal to employee's pay period; other courts held that it
was a question of fact for the jury). See generally Feinman, supra note 9, at 122-24 (providing an
overview of the confusion in this area).
15. HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW Or MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272
(1877) (footnotes omitted).
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ment-at-will rule do not support it, t6 but this hardly matters, because he
obviously was in touch with the zeitgeist. By the early twentieth century,
employment at will had become the general rule throughout the United
States. 17
According to one classic statement of the employment-at-will rule, an
employer can discharge an indefinite-term employee "for good cause, for
no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty
of legal wrong."' 8 Usually regarded as sufficiently indefinite, and there-
fore included within the rule, are promises of "steady," "regular," and
even "permanent" employment. 9 Of course, as Wood's statement sug-
gests, a discharged at-will employee can recover the reasonable value of
the services actually performed.2° Moreover, the statement also demon-
strates that employment at will does not prevent the parties from con-
tracting for a fixed employment term. Such agreements can be express,
but courts may also use the parties' actions, their statements, and the
surrounding circumstances to imply a binding fixed-term contract.2t
B. The Retreat from Employment at Will
Throughout the twentieth century, legislatures and courts have stead-
ily restricted employment at will's scope. Perhaps the most important
legislative restriction is federal labor law, which has generated a system
of collective bargaining in which most union contracts include just cause
discharge provisions that are enforced through arbitration.22 Almost
equally significant is the protection against arbitrary dismissal sometimes
enjoyed by public employees at the federal, state, and local levels. 23 Also
of great importance is state24 and federal25 employment discrimination
16. Shapiro & Tune, supra note 9, at 341-42 & n.54.
17. See, eg., Feinman, supra note 9, at 126-27.
18. Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
19. E.g., John D. Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of
Employment at Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 467-68 (1980).
20. If nothing else, this result is justifiable on quasi-contractual grounds. For a discussion of
the doctrine of quasi-contract, see, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 1.2 (3d ed. 1987).
21. See, e.g., Lary S. Larson, Why We Should Not Abandon the Presumption that Employment
is Terminable At-Will, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 219, 221-24 (1986-1987).
22. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 482-83, 491-92, 499-508 (1976).
23. See, e.g., id. at 497-98; Note, Protecting Employees at WillAgainst Wrongful Discharge: The
Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1934 (1983).
24. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 22, at 492-94.
25. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988) (age discrimination); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) (Title
[Vol. 70:1131
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law, which forbids firings based on race, color, national origin, sex, reli-
gion, age, disability, and other traits or conditions. Miscellaneous groups
such as veterans, debtors, those who take or refuse to take lie detector
tests, and those who exercise their rights under various workplace regula-
tions also are protected against discharge in certain situations.2 6
Furthermore, several common law restrictions on employers' dis-
charge powers have now emerged. Circumstances accompanying certain
firings may provoke intentional tort suits." In addition, employers
whose promises provoke foreseeable reliance may incur promissory es-
toppel liability.28 Moreover, beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
courts have carved out three additional common law exceptions to em-
ployment at will. Together, these three claims constitute an emergent,
albeit incompletely adopted, common law of unjust dismissal or wrongful
discharge.
1. The Public Policy Exception
Under the public policy exception to employment at will, discharged
employees recover for "dismissals that jeopardize a specific public policy
interest of the state."' 2 9 Because this exception usually is a tort theory of
recovery, it lets plaintiffs recover compensatory and punitive damages.3 °
Although estimates of the public policy theory's adoption vary, at least
forty states have accepted it.31
Authorities disagree about the proper sources for the policies on which
plaintiffs may base public policy claims. The dominant view is that such
VII's ban on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin discrimination); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a)
(West 1992 pamphlet) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability).
26. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 22, at 495-97; Mathews, supra note 9, at 1446-47; McWil-
liams, supra note 14, at 343. See also 29 U.S.C.A. § 2002 (Supp. 1992) (forbidding certain dis-
charges under the Employee Polygraph Protection Act).
27. See, e.g., McWilliams, supra note 14, at 344-45 (discussing claims for intentional interfer-
ence with contractual relations, defamation, invasion of privacy, misrepresentation, negligence, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
28. E.g., Blackburn, supra note 19, at 470-71 n.11. See generally Cheryl V. Brady, Note,
Ravello v. County of Hawaii: Promissory Estoppel and the Employment At- Will Doctrine, 8 U. HAW.
L. REV 163 (1986).
29. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Implied Covenant: Anachronism or Augur?, 20 SETON HALL L. REV.
683, 687 (1990).
30. Kenneth T. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial Assess-
ment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAW. 1, 16 (1984).
31. Compare Perritt, supra note 29, at 687 (courts in all but six states recognize the public
policy theory) with IERM, supra note 2, at 505:51 to :52 (listing eight states that have not clearly
adopted the public policy theory).
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policies must be based on either constitutions or statutes.a2 However,
some authorities identify other permissible sources, such as widely ac-
cepted ethical values and the common law.33 Regardless of its nature,
the relevant source normally must state the policy clearly.34
Generally, recoveries under the public policy exception involve firings
motivated by an employee's: (1) refusal to commit an unlawful act,
(2) performance of an important public obligation, or (3) exercise of a
legal right or privilege.35  Examples of the first category include dis-
charges based on an employee's refusal to commit perjury, to violate the
antitrust laws, or to violate other state or federal regulations.36 Firings
based on an employee's performing jury duty, answering a subpoena to
testify before a grand jury, or engaging in whistleblowing exemplify the
second category. 37 The third category encompasses cases where employ-
ees are discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim, joining a
labor union, or refusing to take an illegal polygraph test.38
2. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Section 205 of the Restatement of Contracts declares: "Every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its per-
formance and its enforcement. '39 This implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing has become a general rule of contract law with important
specific applications.' Despite the covenant's use in some prominent
early wrongful discharge decisions,4" it is not widely adopted in this con-
32. See, e.g., Lopatka, supra note 30, at 14-16; McWilliams, supra note 14, at 346 & n.49.
33. See, e.g., Lopatka, supra note 30, at 13-14 (discussing sources that define public policy in
broad ethical terms); Perritt, supra note 1, at 398 (public policy should be manifest in a state or
federal constitution, statute, or administrative regulation, or in the common law).
34. Eg., Lopatka, supra note 30, at 14. In addition, the California Supreme Court has empha-
sized that the policy must benefit thepublic in general rather than some private interest or interests.
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 379-80 (Cal. 1988).
35. Lopatka, supra note 30, at 6-7; Note, supra note 23, at 1932.
36. See, e-g., Lopatka, supra note 30, at 7 (see cases cited therein).
37. See, e.g., id. at 8-11 & n.40; Note, supra note 23, at 1937.
38. See, e.g., Lopatka, supra note 30, at 11; Note, supra note 23, at 1937.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
40. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.17, at 526-29 (1982). The cove-
nant is used in insurance contracts. E.g., Lopatka, supra note 30, at 23. The covenant also has
found recognition in the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977).
41. See Lopatka, supra note 30, at 23-25 (see cases cited therein); Perritt, supra note 29, at 694-
97 (same).
[Vol. 70:1131
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text.4 2 Today it is doubtful whether more than a dozen states recognize
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a theory of recov-
ery in wrongful discharge cases.43
The states that do embrace the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing disagree about the protection that it affords discharged employ-
ees. A comment to section 205 of the Restatement states: "Good faith
performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations
of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized
as involving 'bad faith' because they violate community standards of de-
cency, fairness or reasonableness."'  In the wrongful discharge context,
this comment's two clauses pull in opposite directions. The second
clause emphasizes collective norms that are external to the agreement the
parties made.45 As noted earlier, under an at-will contract an employer
may terminate the relationship for a good reason, for no reason, or even
for a morally improper reason. Thus, in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. ,46
the New Hampshire Supreme Court clearly invoked external norms, and
not the parties' actual deal, when it held that "a termination by the em-
ployer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad
faith or malice or based on retaliation is not [in] the best interest of the
economic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the em-
ployment contract."47 Under this interpretation of the implied covenant,
employees could receive extensive protection against wrongful
discharges.
The Restatement comment's first clause, on the other hand, empha-
sizes the parties' "agreed common purpose" and, more importantly, their
"justified expectations." 48 In an at-will employment, the parties' agreed
42. Eg., Perritt, supra note 29, at 697 (state supreme courts increasingly have either rejected
the covenant or declined to embrace it).
43. See IERM, supra note 2, at 505:51 to :52 (listing only 13 states that clearly recognize the
covenant). Cf. Perritt, supra note 29, at 690, 699, 702-06 (discussing cases from approximately
twelve states that recognize the covenant in some form). In some of these states, the covenant is
treated as a tort theory rather than a contract theory. E.g., Lopatka, supra note 30, at 25 and
sources cited therein.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
45. See Perritt, supra note 29, at 690-91.
46. 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
47. Id. at 551.
48. See also Lopatka, supra note 30, at 23 ("In general, the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is a duty imposed by law that neither party do anything which will injure the right of the
other to receive the benefits of the agreement.").
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common purpose arguably is that either party can terminate at any time
for any reason; in any event, that probably is what each party should
justifiably expect. Thus, if each party can terminate at any time, how can
a bad faith firing breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing? Some courts have analyzed the covenant in much this fashion.49 In
these states, the implied covenant provides relatively little protection to
discharged employees.5 0
3. Liability for Statements by Employers
The third major common law exception to employment at will has
various names and employs various rationales. Its bottom line, however,
is fairly clear. The exception makes employers liable for breaking
promises in: (1) employee handbooks, personnel policies, and benefit
plans; (2) verbal or written assurances about job security that were made
before, during, or after the hiring; and (3) "statements" implied from
business custom and usage. 1 At least thirty-four states have completely
or qualifiedly embraced this exception to employment at will. 2 In these
states, the most important sources of liability are statements contained in
the employer's handbook or policy manual.
The courts which adopt this exception usually use one of three ratio-
nales to justify the liability they impose: (1) an implied contract rationale;
(2) unilateral contract theory; or (3) a broad public policy justification.
The first often is called the implied-in-fact contract exception to employ-
ment at will.5 3 The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a
promise implied by operation of law. But as noted earlier, courts also
can imply binding discharge terms from the parties' actions and state-
49. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (Ariz. 1985). For
additional examples, see infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text. For additional limitations on the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see Perritt, supra note 29, at 702-06.
50. See, e.g., Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1040 (implied covenant protects employee from a dis-
charge based on employer's desire to avoid paying benefits the employee has already earned; cove-
nant also obligates employer to provide suitable working conditions and to compensate an employee
for work performed). See also infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text (detailing the ease with
which employers disclaim the covenant under this reading).
51. See Lopatka, supra note 30, at 19.
52. See IERM, supra note 2, at 505:51 to :52. But see Perritt, supra note 29, at 686 (courts in
virtually every state have adopted the implied-in-fact contract theory).
53. This theory is discussed in Larson, supra note 21, at 229-30; Lopatka, supra note 30, at 17;
Perritt, supra note 1, at 398. Cases utilizing this theory include: Leikvold v. Valley View Commu-
nity Hosp., 688 P.2d 170, 174 (Ariz. 1984); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 383-88
(Cal. 1988); Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 848-49 (Kan. 1987).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss4/4
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ments and the surrounding circumstances. 4 Such binding promises gen-
erally are called implied-in-fact (as opposed to implied-in-law) contract
terms.5 Courts implying such promises to bind an employer naturally
consider the employer's express statements, the definiteness and timing of
such statements, and the parties to whom they were made. 6 But the
courts also may consider other factors, such as the employer's personnel
practices, industry practices, business customs, the nature of the job, the
employee's length of service, and whether the employer consistently has
kept its past promises. 7
The second rationale, unilateral contract theory, probably is limited to
promises in employer handbooks, policy manuals, and similar docu-
ments. Nonetheless, of the three rationales employed to bind employers
to their statements, courts use this rationale most frequently. 8 The ra-
tionale's central idea is to construe a handbook promise as an offer for a
unilateral contract. An employee can accept this offer by beginning or
continuing to perform the services the offer contemplates; if the employee
has no preexisting legal duty to provide those services, the employee's
service furnishes consideration for the employer's promise.59 Courts fre-
quently state that for this liability to exist, a definite or certain promise
from the employer must exist.' Sometimes courts also require that the
employer communicate the promise to the employee in such a manner
that the employee is aware of it and/or has reason to believe that the
employer intends a binding promise.61
Third, courts occasionally use notions of desirable public policy to
make employers' statements binding. In the best example, Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield,62 the Michigan Supreme Court declared that
54. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1036.
56. See Larson, supra note 21, at 230-31.
57. See, e.g., Foley, 765 P.2d at 387; Larson, supra note 21, at 230-31.
58. Cases adopting this rationale include: Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725,
733-35 (Ala. 1987); Watson v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hosps., 720 P.2d 632, 635-36 (Idaho 1986);
Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314, 318-19 (Ill. 1987); Lewis v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 882-83 (Minn. 1986); Cook v. Heck's, Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453,
458-60 (W. Va. 1986). See generally Michael A. Chagares, Comment, Limiting the Employment-at-
Will Rule: Enforcing Policy Manual Promises Through Unilateral Contract Analysis, 16 SETON
HALL L. REV. 465, 477-89 (1986).
59. See, e.g., Duldulao, 505 N.E.2d at 318.
60, E.g., Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So. 2d at 734, 735.
61 E.g., Duldulao, 505 N.E.2d at 318.
62. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980). See also Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081,
1087-88 (Wash. 1984). Cf. Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1062-63 (Wyo. 1986)
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where an employer establishes personnel policies or practices:
[T]he employment relationship is presumably enhanced. The employer
secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force, and the employee the
peace of mind associated with job security and the conviction that he will be
treated fairly .... It is enough [for liability] that the employer chooses,
presumably in its own interest, to create an environment in which the em-
ployee believes that, whatever the personnel policies and practices, they are
established and official at any given time, purport to be fair, and are applied
consistently and uniformly to each employee. The employer has then cre-
ated a situation "instinct with an obligation." 63
For these reasons, the court held "that employer statements of policy...
can give rise to contractual rights in employees without evidence that the
parties mutually agreed that the policy statements would create contrac-
tual rights in the employee.",6
II. DISCLAIMING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE LIABILITY
The rapid proliferation of common law wrongful discharge recoveries
during the 1970s and 1980s naturally led outside observers to urge em-
ployers to implement preventative measures. These included avoiding
actionable terminations, establishing better progressive discipline and in-
ternal grievance procedures, expunging unnecessary promises from docu-
ments distributed to employees, and many others.65 Among these other
measures was a traditional business response to burdensome common
law liability rules: the disclaimer. Like twentieth century sellers and
manufacturers confronted with increased warranty recoveries for defec-
tive goods, 66 employers increasingly have attempted to contract away un-
just dismissal liability in advance. Litigation on the enforceability of
such disclaimers or at-will clauses began at least as early as 1980.67
Courts have considered the issue many times during the 1980s and 1990s,
(consideration for employer's promise is the orderly, cooperative, and loyal work force that it
evokes). However, Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991), may have
undermined Toussaint. See id. at 289 (Cavanagh, C.J., dissenting) (majority opinion virtually over-
rules Toussaint).
63. 292 N.W.2d at 892.
64. Id. Earlier, the court stated that "the parties' minds need not meet," and that it did not
matter if "the employee knows nothing of the particulars of the employer's policies and practices."
Id.
65. See, e.g., Frierson, supra note 8; Qilberg, supra note 8.
66. Cf. LAWRENCE VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 444-47 (2d ed. 1959) (describ-
ing pre-UCC law of warranty disclaimers).
67. See, e.g., Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344, 346 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
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and their decisions often have assisted employers who are intent upon
avoiding wrongful discharge liability.
A. How Employers Try to Disclaim
In the cases involving disclaimers of wrongful discharge liability, the
defendant employers formulated, located, validated, positioned, and
packaged the disclaimers in various ways. Regarding formulation, the
disclaimer is usually stated in one or more of three ways.6" Probably the
most common is a statement that either party can terminate the relation-
ship at any time.69 On occasion the term "at-will" is used.7° Statements
that an employee manual or other document does not create a contract
also appear frequently.71
As for location, employers' disclaimers tend to appear in one or more
of a few sites.72 Perhaps the most common is an employee manual or
handbook.73 Sometimes employers attempt to validate such disclaimers
by inserting them on a "tear-out page" or "sign-off sheet" that employees
are requested or required to sign and return to their employers.74 Other
68. In addition, an employer may use language limiting subordinates' authority to make bind-
ing promises of all kinds. An example of this is language stating that no managers, except certain
identified parties, may hire employees for a definite period of time, or make any agreement contrary
to that stated in the relevant writing. See HENRY H. PERRrrr, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW
AND PRACTICE § 8.8, at 164-66 (3d ed. 1992).
69. E.g., Shaver v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 669 F. Supp. 243, 246 (E.D. Wis. 1986), aff'd, 840
F.2d 1361 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988); Therrien v. United Air Lines, Inc., 670
F. Supp. 1517, 1519 (D. Colo. 1987). Some disclaimers address only the employer's right to termi-
nate the employee. E.g., Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (Miss. 1987).
70. E.g., Lee v. Sperry Corp., 678 F. Supp. 1415, 1418 (D. Minn. 1987).
71. E.g., Butler v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 690 F. Supp. 424, 428-29 (D. Md. 1987).
72. The generalizations in this paragraph are based upon a review of published court decisions
involving disclaimers. These cases can be compared with a recent survey of St. Louis-area human
resource managers and their firms' employment application forms. Of the 131 forms reviewed, 79
(60%) contained a statement attempting to make the employment relationship at-will. A follow-up
telephone survey of 36 human resources managers whose firms used such application-form disclaim-
ers disclosed that 22 (61%) of the firms also included a disclaimer in their employee handbook or
company policies/procedures manual. An additional follow-up survey of 24 managers whose firms
did not include a disclaimer in their employment applications revealed that eight (33%) did place a
disclaimer in their handbook or manual. See Raymond L. Hilgert, Employers Protected by At-Will
Statements, 36 HR MAG., Mar. 198 1, at 57, 59-60. This author's review of the cases differs from the
study by suggesting that handbook disclaimers are more common than disclaimers in employment
applications.
73. E.g., Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 517 A.2d 786, 787-88 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986),
cert. denied, 523 A.2d 1013 (Md. 1987); Bailey v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 120, 121
(N.D. 1986).
74. E.g., Pratt v. Brown Mach. Co., 855 F.2d 1225, 1228 (6th Cir. 1988).
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employers may require employees to sign a separate document contain-
ing a disclaimer-most often, a written agreement 75 or an employment
application. 76 In some situations, employers have used several disclaim-
ers, each in a separate document.7 Only rarely, however, are disclaimers
accompanied by a separate oral explanation of their meaning and effect.78
Disclaimers contained in an employee manual or handbook may ap-
pear at other positions besides a tear-out page or sign-off sheet. Most
commonly, employers place the disclaimers near the front 79 or the rear 0
of the manual. Sometimes, though, employers attempt to bury them in
the manual."1 Finally, disclaimers in employee manuals differ considera-
bly in the conspicuousness with which they are packaged. This is true
regardless of their location in the manual or handbook.
B. Disclaiming Liability under the Public Policy Exception and the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Research does not reveal any decisions denying recovery under the
public policy theory because the employer had disclaimed liability for
wrongful discharge. To date, apparently, no case exists where the de-
fendant even made that argument or the court even discussed the possi-
bility.8 2 Thus, although it seems that no court has squarely so held,
75. Eg., Evans v. Geriatrics, Inc., 1 Ind. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 762, 763 & nl. I (D. Colo.
1986).
76. E.g., Therrien v. United Air Lines, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1517, 1519 (D. Colo. 1987).
77. E.g., Dell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 811 F.2d 970, 972-73 (6th Cir. 1987) (disclaimer
located in disciplinary manual, policy manual, and separate sign-off sheet); Therrien, 670 F. Supp. at
1519, 1523 (disclaimer appeared in three signed employment applications and one additional
document).
78. For a case containing an explanation, see Messerly v. Asamera Minerals, (U.S.) Inc., 780
P.2d 1327 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). In Messerly, the defendant employer supplemented its handbook
disclaimer with an employee meeting at which it distributed the handbook and explained its provi-
sions. Id. at 1329.
79. E.g., Nettles v. Techplan Corp., 704 F. Supp. 95, 96 (D.S.C. 1988) (disclaimer located in
second numbered paragraph of manual's first page).
80. E.g., Davis v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 743 F. Supp. 1273, 1280 (M.D. Tenn. 1990)
(disclaimer located on last page of a 52-page handbook), aff'd, 937 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1991).
81. E.g., Long v. Tazewell/Pekin Consol. Communication Ctr., 574 N.E.2d 1191, 1194 (III.
App. Ct. 1991) (disclaimer "hidden within the text describing the duties of the telecommunicator").
See also Brossard v. IBM Corp., 5 Ind. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 575, 576 (D. Or. 1990) (disclaim-
ers located on various pages of a voluminous manual).
82. Public policy cases that also involve another exception to employment at will have ex-
amined a disclaimer's impact on the alternative theory, without raising the disclaimer issue when
considering the plaintiff's public policy claim. See, e.g., Zaccardi v. Zale Corp., 856 F.2d 1473,
1475-77 (10th Cir. 1988). Some cases did so even though: (1) the employee plaintiff apparently had a
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss4/4
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employers almost certainly cannot disclaim liability for discharges that
are actionable under the public policy exception. This result is unsur-
prising for two reasons. First, the public policy exception normally is a
tort theory, and tort liability generally is more difficult to disclaim than
contract liability.83 Second, public policy cases usually involve inten-
tional employer behavior. Courts routinely strike down contract clauses
that attempt to relieve parties of intentional tort liability, justifying this
practice on public policy grounds.84
However, courts sometimes allow disclaimers to negate recovery under
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.85 These cases in-
volve the weak formulation of the implied covenant discussed earlier.86
Such courts have stated that the covenant only protects the parties' rea-
sonable expectations under the contract, and that in an at-will arrange-
ment a reasonable employee would expect that she could be fired at any
time and for any reason.87 Where the employer has used an enforceable
disclaimer, the courts expressly or impliedly add, the relationship is at-
will.8" This reasoning, however, is unlikely to find favor in those few
states that put some teeth in the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, because those states interpret it to include community standards
external to the deal that the parties made.89 In such states, courts occa-
valid public policy claim, and (2) the disclaimer blocked liability under the other theory. See, e.g.,
Pratt v. Brown Mach. Co., 855 F.2d 1225, 1232-38 (6th Cir. 1988). If courts fail to consider a
disclaimer's application to public policy claims in these situations, it is unclear when they would ever
consider them.
83. See, e.g., Chagares, supra note 8, at 376 n.97 (disclaimers are unlikely to be enforced in
public policy cases because it is a tort theory); Lopatka, supra note 30, at 16-17 (same).
84. E.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, § 5.2, at 333.
85. See, e.g., Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1986); Nettles v.
Techplan Corp., 704 F. Supp. 95, 98 (D.S.C. 1988); Butler v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 690 F.
Supp. 424, 429 (D. Md. 1987). In some of these decisions, courts found the disclaimer effective even
though the implied covenant was regarded as a tort theory. See Maxwell v. Sisters of Charity, 645
F Supp. 937, 939 (D. Mont. 1986); Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 231 Cal. Rptr.
820, 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So. 2d 1086, 1089 (Miss. 1987).
86. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
87. E.g., Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co., 270 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). See
also Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 4 Ind. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1755, 1760 (C.D. Cal. 1989)
(implied covenant only protects parties' rights to receive benefits of an agreement; in an at-will rela-
tionship "there is no agreement to terminate only for good cause"); Maxwell, 645 F. Supp. at 939
(good cause was not required in order to terminate or not renew employment contract).
88. E.g., Slivinsky, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 589 ("Here the parties agreed that their relationship was
terminable at will.").
89. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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sionally allow the implied covenant to override an express disclaimer. 90
C. Claims Based on an Employer's Statements
As noted, decisions allowing a disclaimer to knock out the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing assume that the disclaimer made
the employment terminable at will. Most of the litigation on this ques-
tion, however, involves the third theory of common law wrongful dis-
charge recovery, in which employee plaintiffs argue that their discharges
violate statements made by their employers. Several leading cases that
allow such recoveries also say that employers can avoid liability by using
a properly constructed, stated, and positioned disclaimer.9" This raises
the question, what are the requirements for a viable disclaimer?
1. Counsel from the Commentators
Writers who advise employers on how to ensure that their disclaimers
will be enforced typically urge an elaborate series of procedures. For
example, these writers normally recommend the placement of a broadly
worded, yet clear and nontechnical, disclaimer at the front and/or rear of
an employee handbook or manual; its conspicuous appearance in
capitals, boldface, or a contrasting color; the insertion of similarly stated
and packaged disclaimers in other relevant policy statements distributed
to employees (including benefits statements); and a requirement that em-
ployees sign an employment application, handbook tear-off sheet, or
other document containing both a disclaimer and an acknowledgement
that they understand its impact. 92 Commentators also suggest that be-
cause a disclaimer may not negate specific or strongly worded promises,
employers should phrase their promises in such a way as to minimize
90. See Seubert v. McKesson Corp., 273 Cal. Rptr. 296, 299-300 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (dis-
claimer on signed application form does not defeat a claim based on the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing); Stark v. Circle K Corp., 751 P.2d 162, 166 (Mont. 1988) (implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing not subject to contractual waiver). For a discussion of the breadth of
California's implied covenant and Montana's pre-statutory covenant, see, e.g., Perritt, supra note 29,
at 690, 699, 700-02. Nonetheless, both California and Montana courts have allowed disclaimers to
override the implied covenant. See supra notes 85, 87-88.
91. See, e.g., Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 170, 174 (Ariz. 1984); Tous-
saint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 890-91 (Mich. 1980); Woolley v. Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (N.J. 1985).
92. See Chagares, supra note 8, at 380-91; Witt & Goldman, supra note 8, at 12-15. See also
Lopatka, supra note 30, at 29 & n.152 (emphasizing that requiring employees to sign a disclaimer is
the preferred method and that it should be part of the offer of employment, and suggesting a signed
handbook tear-off sheet as an alternative).
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conflict with the disclaimer.93 Finally, one commentator urges that when
employers change existing handbooks or other policy statements to in-
clude a disclaimer, or when employers require that their employees sign a
disclaimer after commencement of the employment, employers should
create consideration for the rights the employees relinquish by providing
the employees with a return benefit.94
2. The Factors Courts Consider
Employers who follow all of these suggestions almost certainly will
escape wrongful discharge liability for their statements. But many, if not
most, courts allow employers to disclaim wrongful discharge liability
with much less effort. That is, the standards for successfully disclaiming
wrongful discharge liability often are fairly relaxed. Apparently this is
true regardless of the rationale (implied-in-fact contract theory, unilat-
eral contract analysis, or public policy justification) for binding employ-
ers to their statements. Although the courts' divergent approaches and
the many fact patterns they confront preclude clear rules, certain factors
go some way toward determining whether an employer can successfully
disclaim.
Use of a Signed Writing. By far the best predictor of a disclaimer's
success is whether the employer used a signed writing to state and vali-
date the disclaimer.95 With only a few exceptions, 96 employers who re-
quired their employees to sign a writing containing a disclaimer have
avoided liability for their statements about discharge policies and proce-
93. See Chagares, supra note 8, at 392-94. See also Lopatka, supra note 30, at 27-28. Exam-
ples of specific or strongly worded policies that could override a waiver of liability for wrongful
discharge include a detailed grievance or disciplinary procedure that must precede discharge, an
exclusive list of reasons for discharge, statements that the employer must have good cause to dis-
charge, and assertions that the employment is to be "permanent" or that the employee is to have
"tenure." See also infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
94. Lopatka, supra note 30, at 29-30 (suggesting an increase in severance pay or a minimum
notice period before discharge). See also infra notes 140-51 and accompanying text. Of course,
because courts generally do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration, the value of this benefit
need not equal the value of the rights relinquished.
95. Actually, merely requiring that employees sign the statement may suffice. See Rowe v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268, 277-78 (Mich. 1991) (where employee was aware of a
disclaimer on a policy manual sign-off sheet, her refusal to sign the sheet does not prevent the dis-
claimer from being effective).
96. See, eg., Pagdilao v. Maui Intercont. Hotel, 703 F. Supp. 863, 867 (D. Haw. 1988) (refus-
ing to hold that a disclaimer on a signed application form categorically precludes an implied-in-fact
contract claim, largely because court was unsure how the Hawaii Supreme Court would address the
issue).
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dures. Regardless of whether the disclaimer appeared on a signed job
application,9 7 a written employment contract,98 or a signed acknowledge-
ment or tear-off sheet in an employee handbook, 99 the employers were
not liable. Needless to say, employers also escape liability when they use
more than one signed writing,l °° or use a signed writing in combination
with some other type of disclaimer. 101
The Conspicuousness of the Disclaimer. The cases involving a signed
writing almost never consider the disclaimer's conspicuousness within
that writing.102 This factor, however, assumes importance for disclaim-
ers that appear in an employee handbook or manual. Inquiries about
conspicuousness typically involve factors such as the disclaimer's type-
face, its color, and its location within the document.
10 3
Courts vary considerably in approaching the conspicuousness issue.
Some courts do not require-even verbally-that disclaimers be conspic-
uous in order to be enforceable."° For example, in Brossard v. IBM
Corp. ,1o5 the employee plaintiff alleged that his firing breached his super-
visors' promises that he would be retained if he continued to perform his
97. E.g., Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 456, 460-62 (6th Cir. 1986); Forbes v.
Hotel Inter-Continental Maui, 2 Ind. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 833, 838 (D. Haw. 1987); Shaver v.
F.W. Woolworth Co., 669 F. Supp. 243, 245-46 (E.D. Wis. 1986), aff'd, 840 F.2d 1361 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
98. E.g., Nora v. Carrier Corp., 861 F.2d 457, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1988); Crain v. Burroughs
Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849, 852 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
99. Eg., Chesnick v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp., 570 N.E.2d 545, 546, 547-49 (Iil. App. Ct.
1991); Scholz v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 468 N.W.2d 845, 846, 848-49 (Mich. 1991).
100. See, e.g., Therrien v. United Air Lines, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1517, 1519, 1523 (D. Colo. 1987)
(disclaimer appeared in four signed statements, at least three of them in employment applications).
101. Eg., Otis v. Zayre Corp., 703 F. Supp. 634, 635-36 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (disclaimer con-
tained in a signed application and in a personnel manual), aff'd, 884 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1989);
Arnold v. Diet Ctr., Inc., 746 P.2d 1040, 1041, 1043-44 (Idaho 1987) (employer read disclaimer
aloud to plaintiff before he signed it).
102. This is probably due to the general contract rule that one who signs a writing is bound by it
even though he did not read or understand its terms. E.g., CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 20,
§ 9-42.
103. E.g., Nettles v. Techplan Corp., 704 F. Supp. 95, 98 (D.S.C. 1988) (listing factors involved
in conspicuousness determination). A related issue is the effect of the employee plaintiff's knowledge
of the disclaimer. Compare, e.g., Arellano v. Amax Coal Co., 6 Ind. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1399,
1402-03 (D. Wyo. 1991) (inconspicuous disclaimer not enforced even though employee plaintiff read
it) with Audette v. Northeast State Bank, 436 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (arguably
inconspicuous disclaimer enforced because plaintiff failed to claim that she lacked notice of it).
104. See, e.g., Vollrath v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 899 F.2d 533, 534, 535-36 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 345 (1990); Morgan v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 867 F.2d 1023, 1029 (7th Cir.
1989); Bedow v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 5 Ind. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1678, 1679-80 (D. Ariz. 1988),
105. 5 Ind. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 575, 575-77 (D. Or. 1990).
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job properly. Relying on a somewhat inexplicit disclaimer1" 6 buried in
IBM's employee handbook, the court granted IBM's motion for sum-
mary judgment. The court did not discuss the disclaimer's location or its
apparent presentation in regular roman typeface, and did not impose a
conspicuousness requirement on the disclaimer. 10 7
Other courts suggest that the disclaimer must be conspicuous, but are
lenient in interpreting and enforcing this requirement. 108 In perhaps the
best example, Goos v. National Association of Realtors,"°9 the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected a wrongful
discharge claim based on statements in the defendant's employee manual.
Due to disclaimers that were located in the fifth paragraph of the man-
ual's first page and the second paragraph of its section on termination
policy, the court concluded that the employment relation was at will.110
It stated that "[a]lthough these [disclaimers] are not in bold type, out-
lined in red, or made the subject of a so-called 'sign off sheet,' this
[c]ourt, like others, finds it 'difficult to imagine what more the defendant
might have done to make it crystal clear [that]... employees are employ-
ees 'at will' who may be discharged with or without cause.' "
Still other courts, however, impose more or less meaningful conspicu-
ousness requirements. Nonetheless, some of these courts have found dis-
claimers sufficiently conspicuous to block a wrongful discharge claim.
For example, disclaimers meeting these courts' requirements included: a
boxed-off disclaimer with a capitalized heading that appeared at the top
of a handbook's second page;.. 2 a disclaimer that appeared in a policy
manual's introductory paragraphs with its key language in capital let-
ters;' 13 a disclaimer labelled "IMPORTANT" via a centered heading
106. See id. at 575. The explicitness of disclaimers as a factor affecting their enforceability is
discussed infra at notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
107. See id. at 575-77.
108. See, e.g., Thomas v. Garrett Corp., 744 F. Supp. 199, 201 (D. Ariz. 1989) (disclaimer in
ordinary typeface prefaced with a boldfaced heading "Employment Policies" held sufficiently con-
spicuous), aff'd, 904 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1990); Prezzy v. Food Lion, Inc., 4 Ind. Empl. Rights Cas.
(BNA) 996, 997 (D.S.C. 1989) (disclaimer that did not contrast with the rest of the employee man-
ual in either size or color found sufficiently conspicuous because it appeared in a separate paragraph
on the first page after the table of contents); Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 517 A.2d 786, 787-
88, 793 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (finding that disclaimer apparently unaccompanied by anything
to make it stand out was "conspicuous").
109. 715 F. Supp. 2 (D.D.C. 1989).
110. Id. at 4-5.
111. Id. (quoting Dell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 811 F.2d 970, 974 (6th Cir. 1987)).
112. Bailey v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 120, 121, 122-23 (N.D. 1986).
113. Chambers v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 3 Ind. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1476, 1478 (D. Ariz.
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and placed on the first page of a handbook;" 4 a boldfaced disclaimer
appearing at the front of the manual;1 15 and a handbook containing three
separate disclaimers, one of which was at the beginning of the manual
and one of which was in capitals at the end of the manual." 16
Occasionally, however, courts deem a disclaimer inconspicuous and
therefore refuse to enforce it. In Davis v. Connecticut General Life Insur-
ance Co., I 7 the court held that two handbook disclaimers did not auto-
matically prevent the handbook from becoming part of the employment
contract." 8 The court so held because: (1) the disclaimers appeared on
the last page of a fifty-two page handbook; (2) they were not highlighted
or distinguished from the text in any way; (3) they appeared to be printed
in a smaller typeface than the rest of the handbook; and (4) they were not
preceded by a heading. 19
The Disclaimer's Explicitness. Another factor that may determine a
disclaimer's effect is the clarity, directness, and specificity with which it
conveys its message. Here, as with the issue of a disclaimer's conspicu-
ousness, the cases take strikingly different approaches.
Despite fairly emphatic language, some courts are predisposed to find
a disclaimer fuzzy or abstruse. In Haselrig v. Public Storage, Inc., 20 the
court considered two separate handbook disclaimer provisions. The first
provided: "The relationship between you and [the employer] is predi-
cated on an at will basis. That is to say that either the Employee or the
Company may terminate their [sic] employment at their discretion.' 12'
The second disclaimer stated: "It should be understood that employment
and compensation can be terminated, with or without cause and with or
1988). The key words in the disclaimer were: "DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE TERMS OF A
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT." Id.
114. Ferrera v. A.C. Nielsen, 799 P.2d 458, 461 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
115. Butler v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 690 F. Supp. 424, 429 (D. Md. 1987).
116. Johnson v. First Carolina Fin. Corp., 409 S.E.2d 804, 805-06 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991).
117. 743 F. Supp. 1273 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). See also Arellano v. Amax Coal Co., 6 Ind. Empl.
Rights Cas. (BNA) 1399, 1402 (D. Wyo. 1991) (finding handbook disclaimer inconspicuous and
unenforceable as a matter of law where it appeared in middle of a letter on page five of handbook; it
was not underlined, highlighted, or set off; and it was in the same size print as other portions of the
handbook).
118. Davis, 743 F. Supp. at 1279-80. However, the employee lost because the handbook's state-
ments on which he based his claim were too vague. See id. at 1280-81.
119. Id. at 1280.
120. 585 A.2d 294 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). Other examples include Jones v. Central Penin-
sula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 788 (Alaska 1989); Long v. Tazewell/Pekin Consol. Communication
Ctr., 574 N.E.2d 1191, 1193-94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
121. Haselrig, 585 A.2d at 300.
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without notice at any time, at the option of the Company or the Em-
ployee." '122 The Haselrig court found the first provision neither suffi-
ciently clear nor unequivocal because: (1) it stated that the employment
was "predicated on" an at-will basis rather than saying that it "is" an at-
will relationship, and (2) it was simply "a declaration" of the employ-
ment relationship rather than an attempt to limit it.1 2 3 As for the second
provision, the court admitted that it "comes closer to being a dis-
claimer," '24 but its placement at the end of a handbook section dealing
with probationary employees raised a question of whether it was in-
tended to apply only to such employees.1
25
On the other hand, courts sometimes give effect to fairly nebulous dis-
claimer language. For example, in Claiborne v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 26 the
employee plaintiff based her claim on statements in the employee hand-
book. The preface to the handbook stated that the "'employment re-
lationship is one of free will.' ""27 Section 17 of the handbook, entitled
"Working Together," added that: "Agreement with the outlined
company standards of performance and conduct is your decision. The
free will nature of our employment relationship provides you the option
to voluntarily resign your employment should you determine that...
[the company's] important standards are in excess of the commitment
you are willing to make." 1 28 Construing the preface and section 17 to-
gether, the court declared that the employment relationship was at
will.29 It conceded that "the defendant's handbook is not a model of
draftsmanship... ," and that it contained many "omissions and ambigu-
ities."' 3° But "these defects indicate that a contractual relation was not
being defined by the company, as more careful wording would have been
used in such a case."
131
The Definiteness of the Defendant's Promise. Ordinarily a disclaimer is
122. Id.
123. Id. at 300-01.
124. Id. at 301.
125. Id.
126. 718 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Tenn. 1989). Other possible examples include Ferrera v. A.C.
Nielsen, 799 P.2d 458, 461 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); Eldridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan
Soc'y, 417 N.W.2d 797, 800 (N.D. 1987).
127. 718 F. Supp. at 1321.
128. Id.
129. Id. The court bolstered this contention by observing that the handbook also gave the com-
pany the right to change its provisions as necessary.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1321-22.
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separable from the legal claim it attempts to negate. For instance, an
exculpatory clause in a contract is separate from the tort liability it is
designed to prevent. Similarly, a boilerplate disclaimer of the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose in con-
tracts for the sale of goods is separate from those warranties.13 2 In the
employee discharge context, however, the statement on which the plain-
tiff bases his claim and the disclaimer by which the employer attempts to
block that claim often are contained in the same document. Therefore,
when construing the employment agreement, the promise and the dis-
claimer language must be read together, with each playing a role in de-
termining the other's meaning.133
The more emphatic and definite the employer defendant's promise,
therefore, the better the employee's chances of overcoming disclaimer
language in the same document. In Zaccardi v. Zale Corp. ,'34 for exam-
ple, the Tenth Circuit reversed a summary judgment in favor of the em-
ployer. The court stated that "[a] contractual disclaimer does not
automatically negate a document's contractual status and must be read
by reference to the parties' norms of conduct and expectations founded
upon them."' 135 The employee plaintiff relied on certain policy manual
provisions which stated that "[n]o employee who has been employed for
ten (10) years or longer is to be terminated from the company without
the approval of senior corporate management," and that supervisors
"must provide senior corporate management with certain specified infor-
mation" before a firing could occur. 136 In addition, the court considered
the fact that several of the defendant's executives stated in their deposi-
tions that they considered the manual a guide for employer-employee
relations.
On the other hand, where the relevant handbook language is equivo-
cal, general, and scant, a fired employee's possibility of overcoming a
132. For the UCC's treatment of implied warranties and disclaimers of those warranties, see
U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315, 2-316(2),(3) (1977).
133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(2) (1981) (a writing should be inter-
preted as a whole and all writings that are part of the same transaction should be construed to-
gether); Id. § 202(5) (wherever reasonable, manifestations of parties' intentions should be interpreted
in a manner consistent with each other). As the Restatement's drafters stated, "[m]eaning is inevita-
bly dependent on context." Id. § 202(5) cmt. d.
134. 856 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir. 1988). See also Perman v. ArcVentures, Inc., 554 N.E.2d 982,
987 (Il1. Ct. App. 1990) (mandatory, unequivocal policy manual statements created enforceable con-
tract rights despite disclaimer).
135. 856 F.2d at 1476-77 (quotations deleted).
136. Id. at 1477.
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disclaimer declines considerably. For instance, in Sullivan v. Snap-On
Tools Corp., 3 7 the employee plaintiff alleged that he was fired in viola-
tion of the just-cause termination required by his employee handbook.
Since the handbook lacked an explicit just-cause provision, the plaintiff
based his claim on the handbook's progressive discipline language and its
noninclusive list of eighteen infractions that would result in discipline.
The court characterized these provisions in the following fashion:
[T]he handbook lists infractions which may subject an employee to disci-
pline, but the list is not all inclusive. There is no description of the disci-
pline that may be administered for a specific enumerated offense. Glaringly
absent is any enumeration of the grounds for dismissal with cause and there
is no mention of termination with cause. Furthermore, these provisions
place no substantive limits on Snap-On's discretion. The handbook specifi-
cally provides only that the steps will be followed "whenever possible.' 38
Immediately thereafter, the Sullivan court observed that Snap-On's
handbook contained an express at-will clause. Thus, because "[a]n em-
ployer's promise to discharge an employee only for just cause should be
explicit and unambiguous, and such an intent should be clearly ex-
pressed," and because the handbook clearly stated that employees were
terminable at will, the court granted Snap-On's motion for summary
judgment. 139
Modification of a Handbook to Include a Disclaimer. Sometimes the
handbooks to which employers add disclaimers originally contained le-
gally binding statements. In such situations, the new manual and its dis-
claimer constitute an attempt to modify the previous employment
contract. Courts considering the effectiveness of these handbook modifi-
cations ordinarily do not emphasize the factors previously discussed, but
focus on other issues instead. Such courts differ widely in their ap-
proaches to modified handbooks.
Some courts give employers a virtually unfettered ability to add dis-
claimers to their manuals. In Bedow v. Valley National Bank," the de-
fendant tried to enforce a handbook disclaimer that first appeared in
137. 708 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd, 896 F.2d 547 (4th Cir. 1990). See also Elsey v.
Burger King Corp., 917 F.2d 256, 259-60 (6th Cir. 1990) (policy manual statement that job security
is an important company concern was undermined by subsequent statement that each employee
must earn this security by contributing to the company; therefore, statement was too weak to with-
stand a disclaimer in the manual).
138. 708 F. Supp. at 753.
139. Id.
140. 5 Ind. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1678 (D. Ariz. 1988).
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1985, while the plaintiff argued that she had relied on an earlier manual.
The court agreed with the "defendant's proposition that as a matter of
basic contract law, each successive version of defendant's personnel pol-
icy manual modifie[d] and supersede[d] prior issued versions." '141 The
only apparent legal rationale for this position, one reminiscent of the uni-
lateral contract analysis discussed earlier,142 was a brief suggestion that
an employee's continued employment after issuance of the modified
handbook is sufficient consideration to enforce the new term.143
Other courts, however, impose at least some restrictions on employers'
efforts to modify their earlier manuals by including disclaimers.
Although they disagree about who must provide it, courts frequently in-
dicate that consideration must support such modifications.14 Moreover,
courts state that an employer must give an employee reasonable notice of
the modification,14 that the employee must assent to the modification, 
146
or that the employee must be aware of it and understand its terms.
147
Thompson v. Kings Entertainment Co.148 exemplifies most of these re-
quirements. In Thompson, the court concluded that employers should
not be able to unilaterally negate their expressly stated policies simply by
issuing a new handbook with a disclaimer; instead, the employer should
meet "the elements of contract modification."' 149  Specifically, an em-
141. Id. at 1680.
142. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
143. 5 Ind. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1680.
144. Several courts have stated that a handbook modification that makes the employment rela-
tionship at will must be supported by consideration, but courts disagree about which party must
provide it. Compare, eg., Toth v. Square D Co., 712 F. Supp. 1231, 1236 (D.S.C. 1989) (employee
must receive consideration to support modification) and Richard J. Pratt, Comment, Unilateral
Modification of Employment Handbooks: Further Encroachments on the Employment.at-Will Doc-
trine, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 221 (1990) (same) with Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933
F.2d 231, 240 (4th Cir. 1991) (employee's continued employment sufficient consideration to support
modification) and Bedow, 5 Ind. Empl. Rights Cas. at 1680 (same).
Fairness would appear to require that an employee receive something in exchange for the rights
relinquished through a new disclaimer; therefore, the first view appears more sound. To conceptual-
ize this, view the employee as promising to waive the rights extinguished by the disclaimer. To
provide a quid pro quo, the employer should furnish additional consideration for that promise to
waive. See Towns v. Emory Air Freight, Inc., 3 Ind. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 911, 914 n.3 (S.D.
Ohio 1988) (finding waiver of implied contract rights signed by plaintiff null and void because plain-
tiff did not receive consideration for waiver).
145. E.g., In re Certified Question, 443 N.W.2d 112, 113, 120-21 (Mich. 1989). However, it
appears unlikely that employers must expressly reserve the right to disclaim. Id. at 113.
146. See Toth, 712 F. Supp. at 1235-36.
147. Thompson v. Kings Entertainment Co., 653 F. Supp. 871, 876 (E.D. Va. 1987).
148. 653 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Va. 1987).
149. Id. at 875.
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ployer must demonstrate that the employee plaintiff "was aware of the
[new h]andbook, that he understood that its terms governed his employ-
ment, and that he worked according to those terms."'15 Under this test,
the court denied Kings Entertainment's motion for summary judgment
because Kings failed to show that after receiving the new handbook, the
employee continued to work with the understanding that this handbook
governed his employment. If this requirement was met whenever an em-
ployee continues to work with knowledge of the new terms, the court
concluded, an employee effectively would have to take affirmative steps
to reject those terms. This would contradict the general contract rule
that silence does not constitute an acceptance. However, the court did
not specify what behavior on the employee's part would create the
needed understanding. Finally, the court required that the new hand-
book contain "additional benefits for an employee sufficient to provide
consideration for any alleged modification of the employment con-
tract," 151 but it did not elaborate on this requirement.
III. WHEN SHOULD DISCLAIMERS OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
LIABILITY BE ENFORCED?
A. The Irrelevance of Precedent
Those who survey the history of common law wrongful discharge lia-
bility will note the limited role that existing law, especially existing con-
tract doctrine, has played in the evolution of that liability. As noted
earlier, for example, the cases Wood cited for his initial formulation of
the employment-at-will rule probably did not support it.152 Also, one
contract law rationale adduced in the rule's favor apparently fails to jus-
tify it.' 53 Despite substantive differences, modern courts resemble their
predecessors in their disregard for extant doctrine. Precedent hardly
150. Id. at 876.
151. Id. at 875 n.7.
152. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
153. This is the doctrine of mutuality of obligation. Under this doctrine, if one party to a bilat-
eral contract is not bound by the contract, then neither party is bound. E.g., CALAMARI & PE-
RILLO, supra note 20, § 4-12(c)(2). Thus, "it has been reasoned that if the employee can quit his job
at will, then so, too, must the employer have the right to terminate the relationship for any or no
reason." Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1419 (1967) (refusing, however, to endorse
this view). Unless the employment-at-will rule is assumed, however, why is this statement's premise
true? Absent an at-will relationship, why can employees quit without liability? For a similar prob-
lem at the ethical level, see infra note 160.
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compelled the three major common law exceptions to employment at
will. Like Wood's rule itself, today's common law of wrongful discharge
is not the product of stare decisis.
Nowhere is the courts' lack of concern with relevant legal doctrine
more apparent than in the disclaimer cases discussed in the previous sec-
tion. Perhaps the best example is the scant attention those cases accord
the various escape doctrines through which substantively onerous terms
or procedural irregularities justify a party's release from contract liabil-
ity. t"4 Also, courts considering at-will clauses generally ignore the law
regarding such analogous contract terms as exculpatory clauses, product
liability disclaimers, and disclaimers of the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity in the sale of new homes.15 5 But the most glaring example is the
courts' failure to consider attempted disclaimers of express warranty lia-
bility in sale-of-goods cases. 156 Like employers who make assertions
about job security while insisting that the relationship is at will, sellers of
goods sometimes try to take away with one hand what they have prom-
ised with the other. In part for this reason, disclaimers of express war-
ranty liability generally are not enforced. 157
B. Objections to Enforcing At- Will Clauses
Because courts have not been overly preoccupied with strictly legal
154. Such issues rarely are raised in the disclaimer of wrongful discharge liability context. See,
e.g., Anders v. Mobil Chem. Co., 559 N.E.2d 1119, 1123-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (rejecting uncon-
scionability and public policy challenges to a disclaimer); Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 517
A.2d 786, 794 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (rejecting claim that disclaimer was inequitable). See infra
notes 217-42 and accompanying text (discussing two such escape doctrines).
155. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, § 5.2, at 333-35 (exculpatory clauses); Michael J.
Phillips, Unconscionability and Article 2 Implied Warranty Disclaimers, 62 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 199
(1985) (discussing disclaimers of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particu-
lar purpose in sale-of-goods cases); Frona M. Powell, Disclaimers of Implied Warranty in the Sale of
New Homes, 34 VILL. L. REV. 1123 (1989).
156. Such disclaimers are governed by U.C.C. § 2-316(1), which states:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or conduct
tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent
with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence
(Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is
unreasonable.
U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1977).
Comment 1 to § 2-316 provides: "[i]t seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained
language of disclaimer by denying effect to such language when inconsistent with language of express
warranty." U.C.C. § 2-316, official cmt. 1 (1987).
157. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 12-2 to
12-4 (3d ed. 1988).
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concerns when they formulate wrongful discharge rules, it is apparent
that public policy notions have been the dominant influence on their de-
cisions. If so, it seems both permissible and useful to employ such no-
tions to determine how courts should treat disclaimers of wrongful
discharge liability. Such disclaimers are contract terms which state that
employees relinquish certain common-law recoveries for wrongful dis-
charge. Some business ethicists, however, maintain that employees can-
not rightly contract away their job rights."' 8 In addition, the legal and
ethical literature on employment at will contains several important objec-
tions to free bargaining over dismissal rules. These objections are that:
(1) it is irrational for an employee to agree to be employed at will; (2) em-
ployers' superior bargaining power enables them to dictate the discharge
terms they desire; (3) employers typically state and package at-will
clauses in such a way that employees cannot readily understand them;
(4) even when adequate disclaimer disclosure is made, employees' per-
sonal deficiencies render them incapable of effectively protecting their in-
terests when contracting over dismissal terms; and (5) transaction costs
and related problems render it impossible for employers to offer employ-
ees a real choice regarding discharge terms. In this subsection, the Arti-
cle will evaluate the current law on at-will clauses by considering each of
these objections. This consideration leads to the recommendations that
the Article develops in the following section.
1. The Rationality of At- Will Employment
The first objection to enforcing disclaimers of wrongful discharge lia-
bility is that, given a real choice, no employee in his or her right mind
would agree to employment at will. For example, according to the busi-
ness ethicist Patricia Werhane, "it is hard to imagine that rational people
would agree in advance to being fired arbitrarily in an employment con-
tract."1 59 However, there is at least one reason why employees may pre-
158. E.g., Joseph R. Des Jardins & John J. McCall, A Defense of Employee Rights, 4 J. Bus.
ETHICS 367, 369 (1985).
159. PATRICIA H. WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND CORPORATIONS 91 (1985). Although
the author did not elaborate on this point, she may have effectively argued that employee job rights
are by their nature inalienable. Among the many connotations of the term inalienability is the no-
tion that certain rights should not be relinquished, even if such relinquishment is made knowingly
and voluntarily. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7
PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 93, 112-13 (1978). Also, one criterion used to identify whether a right is
inalienable is the irrationality of one's yielding the right. See, e.g., A. John Simmons, Inalienable
Rights and Locke's Treatises, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 175, 201-04 (1983) (developing this crite-
rion, but not necessarily adopting it). However, the text surrounding Werhane's remark suggests
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fer an at-will arrangement:" 6 to obtain a better compensation package.
Giving employees legal protection against wrongful discharge creates
costs and inefficiencies for employers. 161 The expense associated with
wrongful discharge litigation is an obvious example.162 The possibility of
litigation and its related expense may dissuade employers from dis-
that she might not object to an employee's alienation of his job security rights, if it is done volunta-
rily and knowingly.
160. According to Richard Epstein, employment at will may be justified as the outcome of a
rational bargaining process through which employer and employee gain certain powers over, and
immunities from, each other. For example, the ability to arbitrarily terminate the employment rela-
tionship can provide both the employer and the employee a method of controlling each other's
misbehavior. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947,
963-67 (1984). First, the threat of a swift and summary discharge may deter potential malingering
by employees, and the fear of losing valuable employees may discourage an employer from mistreat-
ing its work force. Second, by agreeing to allow either party to terminate the employment contract
for any reason, both employer and employee maximize their own flexibility and freedom of action.
Employers can pursue new lines of business without hinderance from workers they no longer need,
and workers can quit with impunity when better opportunities appear. See id. at 968-69.
In the disclaimer context, however, Epstein's arguments appear inapplicable. The reason is that
Epstein is arguing for the rationality of employment at will in the abstract, while disclaimers operate
against the backdrop of existing common law rules. Although common law in most states limits an
employer's power to arbitrarily terminate its employees, employees do not face similar restrictions
when they arbitrarily quit. Thus, employees already can control employer misbehavior with an
explicit or implicit threat to quit, and they already have the option to move freely to pursue better
opportunities. Why then would a rational employee yield her common law rights in exchange to
obtain powers she already possesses?
It is arguable that this initial asymmetry of rights between employer and employee is unjustified.
See supra note 153. This issue also arises within the ethical debate over the at-will rule. Compare
WERHANE, supra note 159, at 151 (arguing for the asymmetry) and Joseph Des Jardins, Fairness
and Employment-at-Will, 16 J. Soc. PHIL. 31, 35-37 (1985) (same) with Richard A. Posner, Hegel
and Employment at Will: A Comment, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1625, 1630-31 (1989) (attacking the
asymmetry).
161. A recent study by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice concluded that such costs are sig-
nificant; however, the study used circuitous reasoning. First, the study found that after states adopt
pro-employee common-law rules, aggregate employment drops substantially (from two to five per-
cent). See JAMES N. DERTOUZOS & LYNN A. KAROLY, LABOR-MARKET RESPONSES TO EM-
PLOYER LIABILITY 46-61, 62 (1992). The study inferred from this that employers must have
incurred significant expenses due to human-resource practices instituted in response to the changed
legal situation. Id. at 63. In theory, these expenses made labor less desirable in comparison with
other factors of production. However, the study also found that litigation expenses associated with
increased common law job protection are not excessive. See id. at 35-36 and infra note 162. The
authors surmised that personnel managers may be reacting to perceived, rather than actual, risks.
Id. at 64.
162. Eg., Posner, supra note 160, at 1633. However, the RAND Study maintains that such
costs are not excessive. DERTOUZOS & KAROLY, supra note 161, at 35-36. The study estimated that
in 1987 in California, the average litigation-related cost per at-will employee (including awards or
settlements and other related legal expenses) was $10. The "expected legal cost" of terminating that
employee was $100. Id.
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missing troublesome or marginally competent employees, with a result-
ing decline in workplace discipline and efficiency and consequent
monetary losses.'6 3 In an effort to avoid this problem, employers should
also expend more resources in searching for suitable employees and in
evaluating the people they plan to hire.'"
These costs eventually will be borne by someone-the employer, em-
ployees (in the form of lower wages or benefits), and/or consumers (to
the extent that employers can pass on the costs). 1 65 When the costs are
incurred by either the employer or the employee, the affected party may
have an incentive to eliminate the costs by contract. In the former case,
employers may attempt to prevent these costs by offering employees bet-
ter compensation in exchange for an at-will relationship. In the latter
case, employees might accept a lower level of job security in exchange for
higher wages or benefits. As Ian Maitland has observed, "[p]resumably,
if the price is right, some workers will be willing to accept the greater
insecurity of [employment at will].... Likewise, some employers may
value more highly the unrestricted freedom to hire and fire.., and may
be willing to pay higher wages for that flexibility.""' Besides higher
wages and benefits, another reason that employees might accept at-will
employment is their perception that rational employers have few incen-
tives to fire productive workers. 67 Yet another, paradoxically, is that
employees might thereby maximize their likelihood of staying
employed. 16
8
2. Employer Bargaining Power Regarding Discharge Terms
In the preceding discussion, the objective was to determine how ra-
tional employees might behave, and the bargaining process sketched was
a hypothetical one.' 6 9 Nonetheless, some real-world employees might
rationally conclude that accepting at-will employment is justifiable.
163. Eg., Posner, supra note 160, at 1633.
164. Eg., id. at 1634.
165. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, The "New" Terminable-at-Will Employment Contract: An
Interest and Cost-Incidence Analysis, 69 IOWA L. REV. 327, 335-36, 342-44, 356 (1984); Note, Pro-
tecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1829 & n.77 (1980).
166. Ian Maitland, Rights in the Workplace: A Nozickian Argument, 8 J. Bus. ETHICS 951, 952
(1989). See also Posner, supra note 160, at 1629, 1634.
167. E.g., Maitland, supra note 166, at 953.
168. See supra note 161 (discussing an empirical study that shows a correlation between strict
wrongful discharge rules and a decline in aggregate employment).
169. Actual bargaining between employer and employee over discharge terms is unlikely. None-
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Although he admits that employment at will is not for everyone, 170
Richard Epstein goes further by arguing from at-will employment's per-
vasiveness over time to the conclusion that it is in the interest of most
employees. As Epstein asserts, "[i]t is hardly plausible that contracts at
will could be so pervasive in all businesses and at all levels if they did not
serve the interests of employees as well as employers." 17
1
Epstein's argument presents several difficulties. First, its premise is
dubious. Given the prevalence of just-cause provisions in both public
employment and in union contracts, and the many modern legal protec-
tions against wrongful termination, it is questionable whether at-will re-
lationships still dominate the employment landscape. Epstein appears to
argue that if at-will employment is so onerous, worker discontent would
long ago have forced its demise at the hand of courts and legislatures. To
some extent, however, that is exactly what has happened. In addition,
earlier portions of this Article suggest another set of reasons for believing
that many employees do not desire employment at will.172 If employees
are relatively unconcerned about job security, why do so many firms load
their handbooks with promises on the subject? Moreover, why do firms
sometimes package their at-will clauses so deceptively?
Despite these objections to Epstein's position, employment at will did
dominate private-sector nonunion employment before the 1960s. Why
was at-will employment then so pervasive if many employees wanted
more job security? Employment at will's critics can easily offer an expla-
nation: its pervasiveness resulted from the superior bargaining power em-
ployers held. Indeed, this is the most common basis for attacking the
employment-at-will doctrine.1 73 Since employers invariably dominate
theless, properly functioning employment markets can approximate the results that free and equal
bargaining would produce. See infra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
170. "The contract at will is not ideal for every employment relation. No court or legislature
should ever command its use." Epstein, supra note 160, at 951.
171. Id. at 955. See also Maitland, supra note 166, at 953.
172. Some more or less anecdotal evidence suggests the same. See Raymond L. Hilgert, How At-
Will Statements Hurt Employers, 67 PERSONNEL J. 75 (1988). Hilgert reported on his unscientific,
informal survey of 60 business students. When asked whether they would sign a job application
containing an at-will statement, 80% of the students responded that they would if it was necessary to
obtain a job. In addition, all 60 stated that they would prefer employment with a firm that did not
require them to sign such a statement. Finally, some students regarded an employer's imposition of
at-will terms as insensitive, demeaning, and domineering. Professor Hilgert's survey is merely sug-
gestive, however, since, inter alia, he failed to ask the students whether they would sign an at-will
statement in exchange for higher wages.
173. See, e.g., WERHANE, supra note 159, at 91-92; Blades, supra note 153, at 1404-07; Des
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the employment bargaining process, critics suggest, it is silly to discuss
what bargain a hypothetical rational employee might make and danger-
ous to allow employees to actually contract on discharge policy. In the
latter event, critics would say, employees will "choose" employment at
will precisely because they have little real choice. Since employers domi-
nate the bargaining process, employees also are unlikely to get any extra
compensation when they contract for at-will employment.
Unless one asserts that at-will clauses always are in employees' best
interests, courts presumably should not enforce them when their accept-
ance results from the employer's superior bargaining power. But how
often is this the case? The phrase "superior bargaining power" covers
two situations that often coexist, but that are distinguishable.174 The first
involves coercion or something similar to it-specifically, the ability to
get a knowing but reluctant employee to accept a disadvantageous term.
The second involves employees' unknowing acquiescence to prepackaged
contract terms. This subsection considers this first sense of the phrase
"'unequal bargaining power" and the following subsection considers the
second. Here, the Article concludes that, at least as far as discharge
terms are concerned, superior bargaining power of the first sort does not
typify the employment relation.
Except in the rarest of situations, employers cannot force people to
accept employment. Business firms do not draft their employees; nor can
they stop current or prospective employees from taking a walk if they
dislike the firm's employment terms. This is true even when the em-
ployer is a large company. Indeed, despite apparent statements to the
contrary, 75 superior bargaining power cannot inhere in superior size
alone-in bigness itself, abstracted from any tangible edge it might pro-
vide. However, size may correlate with the market power necessary to
make an employer a monopsonist (a monopoly or oligopoly purchaser of
labor). A monopsony position should give an employer a bargaining
edge,'7 6 but it is unclear how often such positions actually exist. 17 7 Are
Jardins & McCall, supra note 158, at 369-72; David R. Hiley, Employee Rights and the Doctrine of
At- Will Employment, 4 Bus. & PROF. ETHIcS J. 1, 2, 4-6 (1985); Tompkins, supra note 4, at 388.
174. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, § 4.26, at 294-95 (distinguishing between bargaining
power due to one party's creating the document used and bargaining power due to a superior
position).
175. See, e.g., Blades, supra note 153, at 1404-05.
176. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 165, at 351-53.
177 Labor market economists seem to agree that monopsony is not widespread in modem em-
ployment markets. Eg., BELTON M. FLEISHER & THOMAS J. KNIESNER, LABOR ECONOMICS:
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employers frequently monopoly or oligopoly purchasers of labor? In the
latter case, can they collude effectively with other employers and thereby
make any agreement stick? In these cases, how often do barriers to mar-
ket entry prevent competing purchasers of labor from making an appear-
ance? It appears that opponents of employment at will do not discuss
such questions.
Even if an employer or group of employers have a monopsony position
within a particular territory, presumably that position only would afford
them superior bargaining power if employees in that territory are con-
strained from moving or working outside the territory. One example of
such a constraint is the situation where employees have high costs of
relocation.178 Can that example validly be generalized to include other
factors that tend to bind people to a particular locale? Examples of such
factors might include family ties, one's roots in an area, and one's prefer-
ence for a region. But while such reasons may give employers a bargain-
ing edge, it is uncertain whether employees who accept an at-will clause
for these reasons are actually "coerced." Also, the third-party effects of
courts' refusal to enforce an at-will clause in such cases are troubling.
Such a refusal would mean that the affected employees retain some legal
protection against wrongful discharge. However, this protection gener-
ates costs that may be borne by employees (in the form of lower wages or
benefits), by employers (or their shareholders), or by consumers of the
employer's products or services (if the employer can pass on the costs). 179
In the first instance, employees are paying for their ties, roots, or prefer-
ences. But in the second and third situations, third parties effectively are
subsidizing those attachments. Why should they be required to do so?18O
Other alleged sources of employers' superior bargaining power have
little correlation with the employer's size. Commentators often note that
THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY 213 (3d ed. 1970) ("we feel confident that monopsony is not
widespread today"); DANIEL S. HAMERMESH & ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF WORK AND
PAY 121 (3d ed. 1984) ("[tlhere is some reason to think that the monopsony case has been given
more attention in textbooks and the economics literature than its actual importance would war-
rant"); SAUL D. HOFFMAN, LABOR MARKET ECONOMICS 49 (1986) (unclear "whether monopsony
today is common enough to constitute a serious problem").
178. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 300 (3d ed. 1986).
179. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
180. The argument may also apply to another of Posner's possible sources of monopsony power:
employee ignorance of alternative terms. POSNER, supra note 178, at 300. Should third parties,
such as consumers or the employer's shareholders, be made to subsidize employees for their igno-
rance? Or should third parties subsidize employees only when such ignorance is beyond those em-
ployees' control?
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employer bargaining power increases in times of high unemployment,
without noting that it presumably declines when unemployment
drops."' 1 Similarly, some have argued that because America does not
have a full-employment economy, it is "meaningless to maintain that an
employee, who has no alternative employment available, has the freedom
to leave his job."' 8 2 But these commentators do not tell us how often
employees are without alternative employment. Finally, some opponents
of employment at will maintain that today's increased specialization of
labor binds employees to a particular employer and thus increases the
employer's power over them.8 3 Clearly, however, this is a two-edged
sword. "[P]recisely because this [specialized] employee is more produc-
tive than a new replacement would be, he can threaten the employer with
quitting .... It is a game of chicken, likely to end in a stand-off."' 84
3. Inadequate Disclosure of the Employer's Terms
The preceding summary suggests that while employers and employees
do not always bargain on equal terms, employment relations do not dis-
play pervasive inequalities. Therefore, while courts should selectively in-
validate at-will agreements when they are the product of superior
employer bargaining power, nothing justifies a blanket refusal to enforce
at-will agreements. However, attitudes on the bargaining power issue are
so strongly entrenched that the preceding arguments are unlikely to con-
vince those who view employees as victims of employer coercion. One
likely reason for this is that such people tend to focus on the interactions
between employer and employee, while their opponents emphasize the
systemic-largely market-factors that make employers offer certain em-
ployment terms. The former group sometimes appears to embrace the
following rule: if individual employees cannot meaningfully bargain with
their employer, the employer has superior bargaining power.18 5 This
proposition loses its persuasiveness when one realizes that if inflexibility
181. Eg., Des Jardins & McCall, supra note 158, at 370.
182. Ellen Rust Peirce, et a]., Employee Termination at Will: A Principled Approach, 28 VILL. L.
REV. 1, 38-39 (1982-1983).
183. E.g., Blades, supra note 153, at 1405.
184. POSNER, supra note 160, at 1632.
185. Consider, for example, Peter Linzer's response to Richard Epstein's claim that employees
should be able to extract extra compensation from employers who require them to sign a yellow-dog
contract. "One visualizes the pre-New Deal job applicant saying, 'What will you give me for the
yellow dog clause?' One suspects that the answer would have been 'I'll give you a job.' " Peter
Linzer, The Decline ofAssent: At- Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law
Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 414 (1986). However, while pre-New Deal employers may have had
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on terms is a signal of superior bargaining power, all are exploited by
grocery stores, restaurants, and innumerable other such establishments.
As will be demonstrated later, moreover, firms often have innocent rea-
sons for refusing to bargain on standard-form terms. 8 6 As will also be
shown, an individual firm's refusal to bargain does not prevent other em-
ployers from offering different terms. Indeed, competition among em-
ployers for employees may force employers to offer employees
nonexploitive terms of employment.1
87
For competition to function, however, employees must be aware of the
relevant terms of employment. As earlier portions of the Article clearly
indicate, this often is not the case for disclaimers of wrongful discharge
liability. Some disclaimers are poorly positioned, inconspicuous, and/or
imprecisely stated.'88 In these cases, employees are unlikely to under-
stand or appreciate the disclaimer. The same unawareness or misunder-
standing is likely to occur when courts allow employers to change their
discharge policies by adding a disclaimer to their handbooks without
providing their employees adequate notice.' 8 9 But the most egregious
example occurs when an employer makes an express promise regarding
its discharge policy, and the promise is accompanied by a conflicting dis-
claimer.190 As a result, employees may reasonably rely on handbook
"promises" that are negated by the disclaimer. In such instances, it is
probable that employers intentionally make promises concerning their
discharge policies to create favorable attitudes among their employees,
and use disclaimers to avoid fulfilling those promises. 9'
the power to take this approach, Linzer does not explain why. Specifically, he does not examine the
options available to the hypothetical job applicant.
186. See infra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
187. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 81, 102-11, 126-31, 140-43 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
190. Because most litigation over the third exception to employment at will involves promises in
handbooks, and because many disclaimers are located in handbooks, this situation is common. For
specific examples, see supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text. On the egregiousness of such
situations, see, e.g., Small v. Springs Indus., 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (S.C. 1988) ("strong equitable and
policy reasons militat[e] against allowing employers to promulgate.., potentially misleading person-
nel manuals while reserving the right to deviate from them at their own caprice").
191. For example, one writer observes that an employee handbook can be an effective manage-
ment tool by: (1) building a favorable image of the firm in the employees' eyes, (2) communicating
the employer's attitudes and expectations about the employment relationship, (3) setting forth spe-
cific work rules, (4) stating the employer's dispute-resolution procedures, and (5) serving as a symbol
of stability and security for employees. See Coombe, supra note 8, at 10-13.
Regarding the fifth function, the handbook represents "the employer's good will" and its "desire
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss4/4
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4. Employee Capacity to Utilize Enhanced Disclosure
In theory, affording employees greater knowledge of their employers'
discharge terms will cure the ills described earlier. In pursuit of this
goal, the Article's next section proposes stringent disclosure, conspicu-
ousness, and authentication standards for the enforceability of at-will
clauses. But even if such disclosure occurs, would employees effectively
utilize it? In this context, three problems exist.
First, many employees may not actually read their handbooks1 92 or
devote serious attention to disclaimers on employment applications. If
this is the case, would this Article's recommended super-disclosure of
such terms alleviate the problem? In some cases super-disclosure proba-
bly would raise an employee's awareness of his firm's discharge policy.
In others, it might not, but the failure is unimportant. Certainly some
employees' unwillingness to read a suitably communicated at-will clause
does not justify an across-the-board refusal to enforce such terms. How
can such employees' inattention justify denying an at-will relationship to
another employee who knowingly and voluntarily chooses it? Another
reason why employees who fail to read a suitably communicated at-will
clause should not be able to avoid its effect is that otherwise they would
have an incentive to claim ignorance of known terms.
A second argument for individual incapacity asserts that in many
"standard-form" contexts such as insurance contracts, disclaimers of im-
plied warranties, and credit card contracts, the complexity of the con-
tract's subject matter and/or the relevant law justify imposing
to provide a pleasant, safe, and rewarding work place"; therefore, it is "the equivalent of the union
contract in a nonunion setting." Id. at 13. Although handbook promises may not be legally en-
forceable, employers who breach them risk losing credibility with their employees. Thus, "employ-
ers should include in the employee handbook only those provisions that they are willing to live
with." Id.
The next page, however, states that to minimize wrongful discharge liability, employers should
eliminate troublesome expressions such as "permanent employment," "discharge for cause," and
"job security" from their handbooks. Id. at 14. "Instead, the employer should either list specifically
the events that will result in discharge or state that it reserves the right to discharge at any time for
any reason." Id. Moreover, employers are advised to consider inserting a disclaimer in the hand-
book, and then give rudimentary instructions on the subject. See id. at 15-16.
Apparently, the effective "union contract" created by the handbook is not intended to be binding.
Similarly, it appears that there are no handbook provisions with which an employer should be will-
ing to live. But until employees learn otherwise, the handbook may cause them to believe in the
employer's good will, to feel secure about their job, and thereby benefit the employer.
192. Cf. Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1174, 1179 n.22 (1983) (author's informal, long-term survey of lawyers and law professors illustrates
that few actually read standard-form contracts such as bank-card agreements).
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standardized terms because only the most attentive, informed, and hard-
working consumers could possibly understand, digest, and assimilate the
relevant information. 193 However, employment at will is a subject that
almost anyone can grasp. Certainly Epstein was right when he said that
"[w]ith employment contracts.., we are dealing with the routine stuff of
ordinary life.... An employee who knows that he can quit at will under-
stands what it means to be fired at will, even though he may not like it
after the fact."19
Finally, even if discharge terms are properly communicated to an em-
ployee, he is aware of those terms, and he understands the terms' mean-
ing, does the employee really grasp the likelihood and the consequences
of being fired when he commences his employment with an employer?
As one author has argued:
Employees may for a variety of reasons misperceive their best interests at
the outset of the employment relationship. For example, employees may
tend to discount substantially the risk of wrongful discharge, and as a result
systematically undervalue job security.... Either a false sense of security or
a failure to realize the risks involved may therefore lead employees to seek
wage increases rather than forgo some immediate benefits in return for an
appropriate level of job protection.195
Although this argument has appeal, specific evidence for such employee
misperceptions is not overwhelming. 196 In particular, it is unclear how
often employees underestimate the odds of being fired, and by how much.
Even if significant misjudgments are common, it does not follow that the
law should try to dictate a preferred discharge term. As argued at length
earlier, there is no single discharge policy to which rational minds ineluc-
tably must assent.' 97 When deciding whether to accept an at-will clause,
a rational employee presumably would multiply the magnitude of a fir-
ing's disutility by its probability. That disutility almost certainly will
vary from person to person. The probability in question cannot be quan-
tified with any degree of certainty, but it is likely to be relatively low for
193. See, eg., Phillips, supra note 155, at 243 (arguing that freedom of contract cannot justify
the enforcement of implied warranty disclaimers because consumers cannot understand their mean-
ing or legal significance).
194. Epstein, supra note 160, at 954-55.
195. Note, supra note 165, at 1831-32.
196. See id. at 1831 & nn.82-84 (highlighting studies supporting the author's position, suggesting
that employee misperceptions can result from the common propensity not to contemplate disaster,
noting that employees lack information regarding the employer's past discharge practices, and ob-
serving that employers prefer to mislead employees on this score).
197. See generally supra notes 159-72 and accompanying text.
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productive employees.1 98 In addition, some people value present gain
(the superior compensation package that should result from an at-will
relationship) more than the reduction of a longer-term risk (being arbi-
trarily fired) that more favorable discharge terms would afford them.
Again, there is no "right" discharge policy that will suit everyone. 199
5. Transaction Costs and Disincentives to Bargain
As suggested at various points above, full disclosure of employers' dis-
charge terms provides potential benefits for employees who are aware of
those terms and who act on that awareness. Assuming relatively equal
bargaining power, they may be able to obtain the package of dismissal
and compensation terms that best suits them. It initially appears, how-
ever, that transaction costs may prevent employers and employees from
reaching agreement on optimum terms. As one scholar concluded:
"[t]he problem is not whether the parties have the capacity to use the
market system as a medium for the expression of their preferences as in
the instance of unequal bargaining power, but rather, whether there are
cost barriers to the transaction itself." 2" Such barriers-the costs of in-
dividualized bargaining regarding the level of compensation and job se-
curity-include the administrative and record-keeping expenses incurred
by a large employer that negotiates with many employees.2 °1 Such costs
might defeat mutually beneficial agreements. For example, "[t]he em-
ployer may not value complete discharge discretion as much as the em-
ployee values job security. This right [to job security] will not be
transferred, however, if the costs of actually negotiating the transfer are
so great that they offset any advantage gained by the exchange. 202
Therefore, employers are unlikely to make individualized deals with
their employees on job security. Another related set of obstacles to indi-
vidualized transactions are the well-known factors that impel firms to use
standardized forms. For instance, standardization of forms helps organi-
zations function more effectively by: (1) allowing easier communication
198. In this connection, two recent authors have calculated yearly probabilities of .000154,
.005768, and .002083 for various kinds of wrongful discharges. See Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D.
Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097, 1106-07
(1989).
199. However, one may reach a different conclusion if the issue is the compulsory provision of
medical insurance or old-age security.
200. Harrison, supra note 165, at 356.
201. Note, supra note 165, at 1830.
202. Harrison, supra note 165, at 356.
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and coordination among departments; (2) enabling top managers to im-
pose optimum policies throughout the firm; and (3) controlling subordi-
nates who may wish to depart from those policies by entering into their
own deals with third parties. 20 3 Employee-by-employee bargaining over
discharge terms could defeat these goals.
Thus, greater disclosure of dismissal terms might benefit employees
relatively little because employers often have disincentives to offer em-
ployees a choice. However, while the need for standardized discharge
terms may prevent one employer from bargaining on such terms, it does
not preclude other employers from offering different discharge terms and
from competing on common terms such as salary. As Maitland argued:
If employers were generally to heed business ethicists and to institute
workplace due process in cases of dismissals-and to take the increased
costs or reduced efficiency out of workers' paychecks-then they would ex-
pose themselves to the pirating of their workers by other (less scrupulous?)
employers who would give workers what they wanted instead of respecting
their rights.
If, on the other hand, many of the workers not currently protected
against unfair dismissal would in fact prefer guarantees of workplace due
process--and would be willing to pay for it-then such guarantees would
be an effective recruiting tool for an entrepreneurial employer. That is, em-
ployers are driven by their own self-interest to offer a package of benefits
and rights that will attract and retain employees.' °4
Would employers actually behave in this manner? Because employees
differ in how they value job security relative to other elements in the
rights/benefits package, they should demand different packages. How-
ever, employers appear to be inclined to disclaim discharge liability
whenever possible, so perhaps they would not respond to the segment of
the work force that seeks job security. However, since employers often
make promises about job security, they clearly have an interest in this
segment. Under the stricter conspicuousness/disclosure requirements
advocated in the next section, such firms no longer could promise job
protection while successfully disclaiming it. Thus, employers would be
forced to choose between people who more strongly value job security
and people who more strongly value other employment terms such as a
better compensation package. Absent collusion, some employers should
203. See Rakoff, supra note 192, at 1222-23. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 211 cmts. a, b (1981).
204. Maitland, supra note 166, at 952-53.
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tailor their rights/benefits packages toward particular segments of the
labor force. Moreover, under most circumstances, collusive agreements
among employers appear very difficult to create and maintain. The rea-
sons collusion among employers is difficult include the number of rele-
vant employers, the difficulties their numbers pose for forming and
enforcing an agreement on the terms offered to employees, and employ-
ers' incentive to cheat on a collusive agreement.
C. A Summary
When, if ever, should employees be allowed to contract away their
common-law protections against wrongful discharge, thus assuming an
at-will status? Because employees have good reasons to accept employ-
ment at will, an agreement to that effect hardly is irrational. But while it
is doubtful that employers normally can coerce people to accept an at-
will employment relationship, the manner in which many employers
package disclaimers creates equal doubt that employees genuinely assent
to them. This objection would be irrelevant where employment at will is
so obviously beneficial that no employee could rationally contract other-
wise. However, this clearly is not the case. Because people bring differ-
ent values, interests, and expectations to the employment relationship, no
single discharge policy can satisfy all employees. Thus, the law of
wrongful discharge liability should promote informed and rational
choices by individual employees. Neither the incapacities of some em-
ployees nor the practicalities that dissuade employers from individual-
ized bargaining are serious obstacles to such a policy.
IV. GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE
Judged by the previous section's standards, much of the current law on
disclaimers of wrongful discharge liability is deficient. Too often, courts
have enforced disclaimers that were poorly equipped to communicate
their message or that were overshadowed by conflicting promises of job
security. Indeed, some disclaimers may have been designed to defeat
knowing and rational employment decisions by employees. But while
misleading employment manuals and poorly packaged disclaimers are
objectionable, manuals and disclaimers that clearly and conspicuously
convey their message can promote informed, rational employee deci-
sions. Thus, the law governing disclaimers of wrongful discharge liabil-
ity should mandate the feasible steps needed to maximize employees'
awareness and understanding of their employers' discharge terms.
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To that end, this section first suggests some ideal rules to govern the
enforceability of at-will clauses-rules which attempt to maximize em-
ployee awareness and understanding of their employers' discharge terms.
The section then explores contract law's resources for attacking disclaim-
ers of wrongful discharge liability. Because almost all litigation on such
clauses involves express or implied-in-fact employer promises, the sec-
tion's recommendations are limited to cases involving those bases of
common-law wrongful discharge liability.2 °5
A. The Ideal Legal Treatment of At- Will Clauses
To further employees' knowledge and appreciation of at-will clauses,
this Article offers the following suggested rules for their enforceability.
These rules are general guidelines that do not attempt to cover every
contingency. But they attempt to outline the form that detailed dis-
claimer rules should take to maximize employee comprehension and as-
sent. Although these standards may go further than any court or
legislature is likely to step, they present each with a suitable target.
The suggested disclaimer rules are as follows:
1. Disclaimers of wrongful discharge liability whose acceptance results
from an employer's superior bargaining power should not be enforced.
Here, the reference is to forms of bargaining power that do not involve
the disclaimer's statement, packaging and placement. Superior employer
205. It may be useful to consider whether those recommendations-and the previous section's
conclusions-should apply to disclaimers of liability under the public policy exception and the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As discussed earlier, employers almost certainly can-
not disclaim wrongful discharge liability in the former case. See supra notes 82-84 and
accompanying text. This section should not disturb that view. The freedom-of-contract rationale
that underlies permissible disclaimers is only one public policy. Public policy exception recoveries
should be limited to cases involving the most important policies-policies that should override free-
dom of contract.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a more difficult matter. In states that follow
the weak version of the covenant, courts routinely enforce at-will clauses. See supra notes 48-50, 85-
88 and accompanying text. However, in the few states where the covenant provides significant sub-
stantive protection, most cases considering attempts to disclaim have disallowed the disclaimer. See
supra notes 44-47, 89-90 and accompanying text. In the "weak covenant" states, at-will clauses that
meet the tests outlined in this Article should be enforced. Such a clause would express the parties'
intent to make the relationship at-will, and this version of the covenant only protects their agreed
common purpose and justified expectations under the contract. In the few states which have estab-
lished a strong form of the covenant, at-will clauses that meet this Article's test probably should not
be enforced. This assumes that under the strong version of the covenant, recovery would be limited
to cases involving serious violations of community moral standards. As with the public policy ex-
ception, the policies reflected by such recoveries would be strong enough to override liberty of
contract.
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power in this sense should be the exception rather than the rule.2°6 But
where such superiority exists and enables an employer to impose a dis-
claimer, the disclaimer should not be enforced. If such power exists, it
should most often result from an employer's monopsony position.
2. To effectively disclaim wrongful discharge liability, employers must:
(a) use a separate writing, (b) that plainly and conspicuously states that the
employment relationship can be terminated for any reason by either party,
and (c) that is signed and acknowledged by the employee. The term
"must" clearly mandates that a separate writing is the exclusive means of
disclaiming wrongful discharge liability. The term "separate writing"
excludes disclaimers contained in handbooks or manuals, tear-off sheets
within these manuals, benefit statements, job applications, and similar
documents. The goal of this rule is to increase the likelihood that current
or potential employees will focus attention on the disclaimer.
To enhance employees' comprehension of the disclaimer's meaning
and consequences, its language should err on the side of bluntness and
colloquialism. Thus, since statements such as "This employment is at
will" or "This employment is not a contract" may be subject to misinter-
pretation, they are inadequate. However, statements such as "Either
party can terminate this employment without legal liability at any time
and for any reason" will suffice. But language that even the most unso-
phisticated can understand is preferable-for example: "We can fire you
at any time and for any reason; likewise, you can quit at any time and for
any reason."
Naturally, employers also must ensure that the writing's key dis-
claimer terms are conspicuous. Thus, the disclaimer's crucial language
must appear in boldface, capital letters, or ink that contrasts with the
remainder of the writing.
For evidentiary reasons, and to further focus attention on the dis-
claimer, the employee must sign and attest to the disclaimer. To guaran-
tee that the employee will be cognizant of the disclaimer, a separate
signed acknowledgement ("I have read and fully understand the terms of
this document") should appear in the separate writing. After signing the
writing, an employee would normally be bound to the disclaimer and
could not argue that she did not read or understand it.2 "7
3. Even if an employer satisfies the above requirements, a disclaimer is
206. See supra notes 173-87 and accompanying text.
207. E.g., CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 20, § 9-42.
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ineffective if the employer makes and breaches a statement regarding dis-
charge policy that: (a) conflicts with the disclaimer, (b) would create liabil-
ity under existing law if considered in isolation from the disclaimer, and
(c) appears in a writing that represents a centrally-dictated organizational
policy. This rule addresses concerns that arise in connection with
promises of job security or discharge procedures in employee handbooks
and benefit plans. If an employer makes and subsequently defaults on
such a promise, and if that breach would create liability under state law if
no disclaimer were present, the disclaimer is unenforceable. This re-
quirement will prevent employers from reaping the benefits of such
promises without becoming legally bound to them.
This rule would apply even if the handbook or benefit plan itself is
replete with at-will statements. As this Article has discussed, courts face
significant problems when conflicting statements regarding discharge
policy appear within a single document. These concerns include the dis-
claimer's location, conspicuousness, and explicitness, as well as the ex-
plicitness of the promise that it is attempting to negate.20 8 Employees
who make a conscientious effort to read an employee manual or benefit
plan face the same problems and are often less equipped to handle them
than the courts. Under the rule proposed here, courts are spared the
burden of construing such documents, and employees are not penalized
for failing to understand them. Instead, employers are bound by the
promises they make, if actionable in isolation from any at-will statements
in the handbook, manual, or benefit statement. Thus, employers are en-
couraged to make only the promises they expect to fulfill.
Since this third rule seems to impose liability on employers for actiona-
ble express and implied-in-fact promises whether they disclaim or not,
one might wonder why employers would even attempt to disclaim. How-
ever, the rule only affects statements contained in a writing that articu-
lates centrally-dictated organizational policies. As this Article has
shown, under the third exception to employment at will employers may
be liable for promises expressly made in or derived from: (1) employee
manuals or handbooks; (2) written benefit plans; (3) separate written as-
surances about job security; (4) oral assurances to the same effect; and
(5) business custom and usage as determined by the firm's personnel
practices, industry practices, longstanding customs, the nature of the job,
the employee's length of service, and the employer's past adherence to its
208. See generally supra notes 102-39 and accompanying text.
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promises."' This Article's suggested rule would prevent a disclaimer
from operating in the first and second cases, and occasionally in the
third.21 However, it would allow a properly constructed disclaimer to
block recovery in the fourth and fifth situations.
Employers' need to regularize and control their discharge policies jus-
tifies this disparate treatment of different promises.211 Promises of the
third, fourth, and fifth type may be inconsistent with standardized firm
policy. Despite company rules to the contrary, for example, a personnel
officer might say whatever she thinks is necessary to convince an impres-
sive job applicant to accept an offer of employment. Even though actual
(express or implied) authority would not exist in such a case, the person-
nel officer could bind the firm if she has apparent authority. Organiza-
tions cannot effectively control all such aberrant behavior. Thus, if
employers are held liable in these cases, they will be unable to standard-
ize their discharge policies and to reap the benefits of such standardiza-
tion. Although this favoritism toward employer interests would result in
an injustice to some employee plaintiffs in situations of the latter three
kinds, these types of promises are also the cases where one's reliance on
the promise is least justifiable. Promises of the first and second types, on
the other hand, are controlled by top management since those statements
reside in official company documents. Thus, employers should have no
difficulty stating consistent policies, and there is no reason to protect em-
ployers who send out these types of conflicting signals.
4. The preceding two rules apply when an employer tries to disclaim
liability based on an earlier promise. This rule limits employers' ability to
standardize their discharge policies when they attempt to amend those
policies to make the relationship at will. Suppose that the XYZ Corpora-
tion's employee handbook promises to discharge employees only for
good cause. Now suppose that XYZ wishes to transform all its workers
into employees dischargeable at will. Although a few courts allow em-
ployers to change the relationship with virtual impunity, most now hold
that such a modification requires some combination of the following:
(1) consideration; (2) notice to the affected employee; and (3) the em-
ployee's assent to the change, or at least his awareness and understanding
209. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
210, Where separate written assurances are at issue, much would depend on their source and the
employee's level in the employer's hierarchy.
211. See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
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of the change.212 Under the Article's second proposed rule, however,
XYZ must have its existing employees sign a valid written disclaimer.
Those employees who refuse to sign the disclaimer would still have a
legally protected right to be terminated only for good cause. Under the
third rule, employers also would have to edit their handbooks to remove
all promises about discharge policy that conflict with the new disclaimer.
Because some employees probably will refuse to sign the new dis-
claimer, this fourth rule compromises the Article's previous emphasis on
standardization. But that concern is overridden by the employer's previ-
ous promise to discharge only for good cause and by the moral claims
that employee reliance on such a promise generates. In addition, em-
ployers may have more leverage over current employees than potential
new hires. Thus, employers should be released from their earlier
promises only when an employee clearly assents to the change, and the
second disclaimer rule provides for such assent. Employers who desper-
ately need an across-the-board at-will policy might consider raising their
employees' compensation package in order to induce them to accept the
new disclaimer.213
B. The Resources of General Contract Law
Due to their aggressiveness, this Article's four suggested rules are less
a blueprint for legislative or judicial action than a target at which legisla-
tures and courts should aim. As section II of the Article indicates,
courts apparently have no interest in hitting this target. Nor have state
legislatures addressed the enforceability of at-will clauses. However, the
1991 version of the Uniform Employment-Termination Act does address
the subject. After establishing a general good cause standard for covered
terminations, 214 the Act allows employer and employee to waive that re-
quirement by express written agreement, if the employer promises that
212. See supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text.
213. A recent version of the Model Uniform Employment-Termination Act has taken a roughly
analogous approach. See Uniform Act, supra note 5, § 4(c), quoted in infra note 215.
214. Uniform Act, supra note 5, § 3(a). Good cause discharges include those caused by an em-
ployee's theft, assault, fighting, destruction of property, use or possession of drugs or alcohol, insub-
ordination, excessive absenteeism or tardiness, incompetence, low productivity, inadequate
performance, and neglect of duty. Id. § 1(4) cmt. Good cause discharges also include good faith
terminations based on reasonable economic grounds. Id.,§ l(4)(ii); Note, Employer Opportunism
and the Need for a Just Cause Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 510, 511 (1989). Finally, employers
must communicate substantive standards to employees. These standards must be applied equally
and accompanied by procedural safeguards. E.g., Summers, supra note 22, at 502-04.
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upon termination it will provide the employee severance payments in
amounts based on the employee's length of service.215 Except for a state-
ment that it does not countenance contracts of adhesion,216 however, the
Act provides no requirements for permissible written agreements. Thus,
if the cases in this Article are an indication of how courts will perform
under a future uniform act, the Act's disclaimer provision may enable
employers to escape significant dollar payments to discharged junior
employees.
In any event, for now the courts must generate changes in wrongful
discharge law. Assuming that the courts are willing, what legal means
are available to implement rules approximating those that this Article
suggests? The general common law of contract is an obvious possibility.
In the past, courts generally have ignored contract law when considering
the enforceability of disclaimers; however, nothing precludes them from
using it. Although contract law may not support as ambitious a program
as the one this Article advocates, it helps curb the worst abuses described
earlier.
L Rules of Contract Interpretation
Occasionally, general rules of contract interpretation may enable em-
ployee plaintiffs to overcome written disclaimers. First, courts should
attempt to read the parties' employment agreement as a whole, so that its
various statements are consistent.21 7 Thus, a disclaimer may fail if it is
more vaguely or less strongly worded than an employer's conflicting
promises regarding discharge policy. 218  Even where the disclaimer is
215. The Uniform Act provides that:
By express written agreement, an employer and an employee may mutually waive the
requirement of good cause for termination, if the employer agrees that upon the termina-
tion of the employee for any reason other than the willful misconduct of the employee, the
employer will provide severance pay in an amount equal to at least one month's pay for
each period of employment totaling one year, of employment, up to a maximum total pay-
ment equal to 30 months' pay at the employee's rate of pay in effect immediately before the
termination.
Uniform Act, supra note 5, § 4(c).
The comment to § 4 suggests that, as a practical matter, employers will most often use disclaimers
for management personnel, key professionals, and others not subject to periodic layoff. This is be-
cause under the Act, workers who are laid off for more than two months can treat the layoff as a
"termination," and thus trigger the disclaimer provision's severance pay requirement. See id.
§§ l(8)(ii), 4(b); see also § 4 cmt.
216. Id. § 4 cmt.
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 202(2), 202(5) (1981).
218. See supra notes 120-39 and accompanying text.
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precise and emphatic, employer and employee may still attach different
meanings to agreements that combine conflicting promises and disclaim-
ers. In these cases, the Restatement of Contracts states that courts
should interpret the agreement in accordance with the employee's under-
standing if either: (1) the employee was unaware of the employer's inter-
pretation, but the employer knew of the employee's reading; or (2) the
employee lacked reason to know of the employer's reading, but the em-
ployer had reason to know of the employee's interpretation. 21 9 Because
in some of these situations employers may be intentionally trying to mis-
lead their employees,220 this rule of construction may apply fairly often.
Finally, a general rule of contract construction states that courts should
prefer the interpretation of an agreement which works against the party
who drafted it-here, the employer.22'
2. Nonbinding Terms in Offers
In some cases, a disclaimer can be regarded as part of an offer to con-
tract; examples include disclaimers in employment applications or actual
contracts of employment. However, an offeree who accepts a written of-
fer is not invariably bound to all the terms that it contains. Instead, an
offeree is bound only if he should have reasonably understood that the
relevant term was part of the offer.222 Thus, fine-print or deceptively
positioned offer provisions often are not considered part of the con-
tract.223 Therefore, the courts' unwillingness to consider the conspicu-
ousness of disclaimer terms in signed employment applications or
employment contracts is dubious.224
3. Unconscionability
In language closely resembling the unconscionability provision in Arti-
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(2) (1981). Cf. id. § 211(2) (standardized
agreements should treat similarly those who are similarly situated without regard to their knowledge
or understanding of the agreement's standard terms). Elaborating on § 211(2), the Restatement's
drafters stated: "courts in construing and applying a standardized contract seek to effectuate the
reasonable expectations of the average member of the public who accepts it." Id. § 211 cmt. e,
220. See supra note 191.
221. Id. § 206; FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, at 298.
222. E.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, § 4.26.
223. E.g., CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 20, § 9-43(a).
224. On this unwillingness, see supra note 102 and accompanying text. A possible reason for the
courts' unwillingness is the general rule that one who signs a writing is bound to its terms even if the
party did not read or understand the writing. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 20, §§ 9-41 to
9-43(a).
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cle 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code,2 25 section 208 of the Restatement
of Contracts provides:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is
made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the re-
mainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit
the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable
result.2 26
As Professors Calamari and Perillo have observed, unconscionability
"has entered the general law of contracts." 227 Thus, a court that finds an
at-will clause unconscionable could refuse to enforce it, or could modify
it to avoid an unconscionable result.
The dominant mode of unconscionability analysis tells courts to ex-
amine the agreement and the allegedly offending term for both proce-
dural and substantive unconscionability.22 8 Courts consider the
following three general factors when determining procedural unconscio-
nability: (1) the parties and their traits; (2) the way the ostensibly blame-
worthy party has stated and packaged the allegedly offending terms; and
(3) that party's power and its tactics. Under the first factor, courts have
been sympathetic to especially ignorant, unsophisticated, and susceptible
parties. 229 Some employees may qualify under this category. Regarding
the second factor, courts often are suspicious of contract terms stated in
small print or in unintelligible language, or contract language buried
within the agreement. 2
3 °
Third, superior bargaining power-the absence of meaningful
choice-is a relevant consideration to courts addressing unconscionabil-
ity cases.2 1 Although it is doubtful whether employers normally can
force employees to accept undesirable terms, 23 2 this no doubt happens in
some cases. More importantly, the manner in which many employers
package at-will clauses gives them a practical edge over employees. 233
Regarding employer tactics in unconscionability cases, courts will attack
225, U C.C. § 2-302(1) (1977).
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
227. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 20, § 9-39.
228. See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 157, §§ 4-2 to 4-8.
229. E.g., CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 20, § 9-40; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 157,
§ 4-3.
230. E.g., CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 20, § 9-40; FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, § 4.28.
231. Eg., CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 20, § 9-40; FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, § 4.28.
232. See supra notes 173-87 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 102-16, 126-31, 188-91 and accompanying text.
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"sharp practices" and guile.2 34 Employers who promise job security with
one hand, while disclaiming it with the other, arguably are guilty of both.
Finally, encompassing all these factors is an issue which is central to this
Article: employees' genuinely knowing and voluntary subjective assent
to the challenged term, as opposed to an objective meeting of the
minds.23 5
Thus, cases regarding disclaimers of wrongful discharge liability often
present procedural issues. When procedural problems are abundant or
severe, they may justify a conclusion of procedural unconscionability.
However, a finding of procedural unconscionability would not alone suf-
fice to render a contract term unconscionable.236 Unless a contract's sub-
stantive terms are also unjust, why should courts worry about unfairness
in the bargaining process? However, if a high degree of procedural un-
conscionability is present, courts sometimes require only a slight amount
of substantive unconscionability.237
As this Article's preceding section explains, objections to disclaimers
of wrongful discharge liability are largely procedural. And at first glance
it appears ridiculous to describe at-will clauses as substantively uncon-
scionable. After all, they merely make the employment relationship at-
will, and since when is employment at will unconscionable? In fact,
some employees may rationally regard an at-will term as beneficial.
However, disclaimers of wrongful discharge liability are not beneficial to
all employees. Thus, at-will clauses appear substantively conscionable in
some cases (roughly, when the discharged employee received a quid pro
quo for the at-will clause), but they appear substantively unconscionable
in other cases (roughly, when the employee received no extra benefit for
the disclaimer and was terminated in violation of an express promise).
Only rarely would additional compensation for a disclaimer result from
an explicit deal. Therefore, courts probably lack the resources to reliably
distinguish these two situations.
Given all these difficulties, the best course is for courts to declare dis-
claimers of wrongful discharge liability unconscionable whenever a rea-
234. E.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, § 4.28; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 157, at 187-88.
235. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 20, § 9-40.
236. E.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 157, § 4-7 (most courts require a certain level of
procedural unconscionability and a certain amount of substantive unconscionability).
237. "[A] contract that is one hundred pounds substantively unconscionable may require only
two pounds of procedural unconscionability to render it unenforceable and vice versa." Id. at 200,
See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, at 315.
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sonably significant degree of procedural unconscionability exists. 238 The
most obvious examples include situations in which the employer pack-
aged the disclaimer so as to make its detection and comprehension diffi-
cult and/or in which the employer's promises regarding termination
procedures or job security would cause a reasonable employee to disre-
gard the disclaimer.2 39 Where such procedural defects exist, it is unlikely
that the affected employee derived any benefit from the disclaimer.
Under this rule, nonetheless, a court may sometimes find a disclaimer
of discharge liability unconscionable even though the employee plaintiff
received a quid pro quo by accepting it. Thus, this proposed rule can
contradict the general rule that at least some substantive unconscionabil-
ity must exist for an overall finding of unconscionability. But this is
hardly unprecedented. For example, courts have often invalidated dis-
claimers of the Uniform Commercial Code's implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose on unconscionability
grounds. 2 ° They have done so even when some buyers probably ob-
tained a better deal due to the disclaimer. All other things being equal,
products accompanied by an implied warranty disclaimer should cost
less than products sold without a disclaimer.241 Although courts cannot
reliably determine when buyers have benefitted from an implied warranty
disclaimer, they have still declared such disclaimers unconscionable.
Procedural concerns often dominate these decisions.242
V. CONCLUSION
In several ways, this Article conflicts with dominant judicial and
scholarly approaches to employment at will and at-will clauses. For ex-
ample, the Article proposes much stricter scrutiny of such clauses than
courts now practice. Thus, the Article is not another "how-to" piece
designed to help employers evade express promises they made their em-
ployees. Instead, it attempts to identify and develop legal rules that
238. "[Certain] terms may be unconscionable in some contexts but not in others. Overall imbal-
ance and weaknesses in the bargaining process are then important." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. e (1981).
239. The latter situation resembles that where a seller of goods attempts to disclaim an express
warranty. Here, the disclaimer typically fails. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 155, at 223-36.
241. See, eg., Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination ofNonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L.
REV. 1053, 1057-58 (1977).
242. See Phillips, supra note 155, at 229-30.
1177
Washington University Open Scholarship
1178 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 70:1131
would maximize employees' ability to choose the most suitable discharge
terms.
The Article also differs from most evaluative scholarly commentary on
employment at will.243 Most of this commentary is dominated by two
divergent views about employees. Each suffers from excessive confidence
about the termination policy that rational employees would choose, and
from an overeagerness to read that choice into the common law of
wrongful discharge. Under one view, most employees desire the higher
pay employment at will presumably affords them; to such people, a dis-
claimer of wrongful discharge liability is an opportunity, not an imposi-
tion. Under the other view, most employees value job security above all
other things, and would not willingly accept a disclaimer.
In contrast, this Article proposes what apparently are radical positions
within the policy debate over employment at will. It maintains that be-
cause employees might legitimately differ on the subject, there is no
"right" discharge policy. Whatever may be true about disclaimers in
other areas of the law, termination rules are one subject on which people
have the ability and the power to make their own choices. Existing law
governing at-will clauses, however, hinders employees from making
those choices. Thus, courts or legislatures should reshape that law to
crack down on disclaimers of wrongful discharge liability.
243. However, one recent author has made recommendations that somewhat resemble those of-
fered here. See Comment, Peter S. Partee, Reversing the Presumption of Employment at Will, 44
VAND. L. REv. 689 (1991). Partee recommends that courts abandon employment at will and in-
stead establish a rebuttable presumption that employees can be fired only for just cause. Id. at 709.
An employer could rebut the presumption by proving that it lacks monopoly (ie., monopsony)
power, and that it made an at-will agreement with the plaintiff employee. Id.
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